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QUESTIONING THE RULE OF CAPTURE METAPHOR FOR
NINETEENTH CENTURY PUBLIC LAND LAW:
A LOOK AT R.S. 2477

JAMES

BY
R. RASBAND"

The literature of public land and natural resources law has
spawned a number of powerful metaphors to describe Euro-Ameican
settlement of the Amercan West and its consequences. This
conferenceparticipatesin that venerable tradtion, using "The Rule of
Capture"as a metaphorfor nineteenth century public land and natural
resources law and inviting participants to investigate the rule's
consequences. Public land and naturalresourceslaw in the nineteenth
century, however, cannot fairly be circumscribedby the metaphor of
capture. The settlement of the American West, and the publc land
laws designed to facilitate it, required more than simple resource
capture. At least as often, ownership dependedupon improvement.
Although the variouspublic landlaws requiringimprovement had
plenty of capturecharacteristics,the problem with the metaphoris that
it both undervaluesand overvalues the nature of resourceownership in
the nineteenth century The capture metaphor undervalues resource
ownership because the imagery of capture is of farmers, ranchers,
miners, and other settlers acquiringownership merely by possession,
which subtly devalues their ownership claims and reliance interests.
On the other hand, because pure capture can be the basis of a
legitimate ownership claim, describing improvement-demanding
naturalresource laws as rules of capturemay inadvertentlystrengthen
an otherwise dubious claim of vested rights.
This article investigates the viabilhty of the capture metaphor by
consideringa ratherobscure section of the 1866 mining law known as
R.S. 2477 which grants to state andlocal governments "therightof way
for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for
(© James R. Rasband, 2005. Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. B.A. 1986, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1989 Harvard Law School. The author also
serves as Utah Governor Jon Huntsman Jr.'s appointee to the Utah Constitutional Defense
Council. By statute, the Constitutional Defense Council advises the governor and state
legislature on a variety of public land issues in Utah, including R.S. 2477. See UTAH CODE ANN
§ 63C-4-102, et seq. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of either the Governor or the Constitutional Defense Council. I
thank Paul Shakespear for his helpful research assistance. Comments can be directed to
Rasbandj@lawgate.byu.edu.
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public uses." Although R .S 2477 was repealed with the passage of the
FederalLand Polcy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976, FLPMA also
promised to preserve valid existing rights, meaning that any R.S 2477
right-of-way createdprior to 1976 would not be lost. Given the vast
number of R.S. 2477 claims and because designation of wilderness
generally requires an area to be roadless,the presence of an R.S 2477
road can have significant consequences. The actual impact of the
statute depends upon what sort of aeivities amount to "construction"
under the statute. Whether R.S 2477is understood as an improvement
rule requiring self conscious, mechanical construction, as the
environmental community suggests, or as a capture rule allowing
construction to be accomplished by mere use, the so-called "beaten
path" standardadvocated by states and ruralcounties, depends in part
on whether the capture metaphor is an accurate characterizationof
nineteenth centurypublic land andnaturalresourceslaw.
I.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The literature of public land and natural resources law has spawned a
number of powerful metaphors to describe Euro-American settlement of the
American West and its consequences. Referring to the voracious resource
consumption and land acquisition of speculators, miners, railroads, and
timber companies during the second half of the nineteenth century, historian
Vernon Parrington labeled the era "The Great Barbecue."1 In the 1990's,
Charles Wilkinson described as "The Lords of Yesterday" the approximately
3500 public land laws adopted by Congress between 1785 and 1880 that
1 See VERNON L. PARRINGTON, BEGINNINGS OF CRITICAL REALISM IN AMERICA: 1860-1920, at 23
(1958).
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continue to exert a powerful influence on natural resource policy.2 This
conference participates in that venerable tradition by using "The Rule of
Capture" as a metaphor for nineteenth century public land and natural
resources law, and asking participants to investigate the rule's
consequences.
Characterizing capture as mere metaphor may strike some as
inaccurate. After all, there is a legal doctrine of capture. Generations of first
year law students have been introduced to property law by the venerable
case of Pierson v. Post,3 which held that as between two fox hunters, the
hunter who actually killed the fox was entitled to possession rather than the
hunter who first flushed, chased, and tired the fox.4 Ownership of the fox
was a function of capture, of reducing ferae naturaeto possession. At one
level then, the rule of capture is not a metaphor for nineteenth century
natural resources law; it was the law itself. But the conference invitation
seemed to have something broader in mind. Participants were invited to
think of the rule of capture as exemplary of not just wildlife laws but of all
nineteenth century natural resource laws-e.g., water, mining, grazing, road
building. The invitation is tempting because it contains a good deal of truth,
and perhaps that is all that can be expected of any metaphor. But in the end,
the metaphor is one to be resisted or at least more narrowly applied. Public
land and natural resources law in the nineteenth century cannot fairly be
circumscribed by the metaphor of capture. The settlement of the American
West, and the public land laws designed to facilitate it, required more than
simple resource capture. At least as often, ownership depended upon
improvement. Water vested only in those who put the water to beneficial
use; unpatented mining claims required yearly assessment work; Desert
Land Act patents required irrigation; and homestead claims required
cultivation.5 In a nation imbued with John Locke's labor theory of property,6
it typically was not enough to grab a resource. Title depended upon investing
the land or resource with one's labor.
It is also the case that the requirements of such laws were relatively
minimal, often circumvented, and rarely enforced. 7 Thus, it is fair to say that
2 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 17 (1992)

("[W]estwide, natural resource policy is dominated by the lords of
yesterday, a battery of nineteenth-century laws, policies, and ideas that arose under wholly
different social and economic conditions but that remain in effect due to inertia, powerful
lobbying forces, and lack of public awareness.").
3 3 Ca. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
4 Id at 267.
5 See in/in Part II (discussing these laws).
6 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs

Merrill 1952) (1690). ("Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided
and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property."). The labor theory of property was not only supported by Locke's natural
law justification, but also by the arguments of utilitarian philosophers like Bentham and Hume:
"Who sees not.., that whatever is produced or improved by man's art or industry ought, for
ever, to be secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such useful habits and
accomplishments?" DAVID HUME,TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, VOL II, 196 (1739) (quoted in
RICHARD SCHLATFER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 242 (1951)).
7 See infra Part II (discussing some of the fraudulent manipulations of the public land
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even the public land laws requiring improvement had plenty of capture
characteristics. Why, then, does this paper resist the capture metaphor when
it accurately describes a significant swath of natural resource law history?
The problem with the metaphor is that it both undervalues and overvalues
the nature of resource ownership in the nineteenth century. It is at once too
pejorative and too generous.
The capture metaphor undervalues resource ownership because the
imagery of capture is of farmers, ranchers, miners, and other settlers
acquiring ownership merely by possession. Although mere capture can give
rise to ownership even under a traditional Lockean view because the effort
of capture can be understood as mixing the captured resource with the labor
of the capturer,8 the capture image devalues the way in which ownership is
perceived. Favoring the cultivator and improver has a long and distinguished
pedigree in our land and resource law, beginning with the Jeffersonian ideal
of yeoman farmers virtuously mixing their labor with the land.' Indeed,
historically, the distinction between capture and cultivation was an
argument against Indian ownership claims. According to this argument, as
mere hunter-gatherers who did not improve their land,' ° Indian tribes could

laws).
8 Locke reasoned:
We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in which begins the property,
without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not
depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit,
the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place where I have a right
to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent
of anybody. The labor was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in,
has fixed my property in them ....
Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt but that in
the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labor has taken it out of the hands of nature
where it was common and belonged equally to all her children, and has thereby
appropriated it to himself.
LOCKE, supranote 6, at 18.
9 Jefferson's belief that a country of yeoman farmers would produce a virtuous and
engaged citizenry and ensure a republican form of government is well documented. See, e.g, 8
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 426 (1953) (quoted in DANIEL KEMMIS,

COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE 20 (1990)) (writing in 1785 to John Jay, Jefferson stated:
"We have now lands enough to employ an infinite number of people in their cultivation.
Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most
independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country, and wedded to its liberty and
interests, by the most lasting bonds.").
10 The idea that Indian tribes were purely hunter-gatherer societies is something of a fiction,
but a persistent one. Indians, particularly the eastern tribes, were also agriculturalists and
fishermen. See Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifieationsfor Dispossessingthe
Indians, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 23-24 (James M. Smith
ed., 1959) (discussing the creation of the "myth" that Indians were merely nomadic hunters);
David R. Lewis, Native Americans: The Oiginal Rural Westerners, in THE RURAL WEST SINCE
WORLD WAR II 12 (R. Douglas Hurt ed., 1998) ("Nearly half of all native groups participated in
some form of agriculture, producing between 25 and 75 percent of their total subsistence
needs.").
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not possess good title." The notion that improvement increases the strength
of an ownership claim is not relegated to the nineteenth century; it remains a
fixture of the law today. Thus, use of the capture metaphor can subtly
undermine and devalue the ownership claims of those who legitimately rely
on nineteenth century public land laws as the source of their title.
At the same time that the capture metaphor has the potential to
undervalue legitimate resource ownership claims, it can overvalue them as
well. Because pure capture can be the basis of a legitimate ownership
claim, 2 describing certain resource laws as rules of capture may
inadvertently strengthen an otherwise dubious claim of vested rights.
Consider, for example, the water law doctrine of beneficial use. To describe
water rights as a capture rule may tacitly concede that the beneficial use
doctrine was never intended to be an impediment to permanent vested
rights. While historically states have been slow to use the beneficial use
doctrine to limit water diversions,"3 the doctrine's existence suggests a
stronger public interest in water than does a rule of capture metaphor. In
other words, recognizing that nineteenth century judges and lawmakers did
not recklessly adopt capture rules for all resources may actually open
opportunities to challenge assertions of vested rights in natural resources.
If one of the core functions of takings doctrine is to protect property
owners' reliance interests, it is imperative to accurately identify those
4
interests. In the terminology of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
11 Consider the seminal case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), in which
the Court was faced with the question of what sort of title Indian tribes possessed to their
traditional lands. McIntosh, the party claiming title from the United States, argued that the
Indians could not give good title because "by the law of nature," the Indians could not have
acquired a property interest in their lands:
Upon this principle the North American Indians could have acquired no proprietary
interest in the vast tracts of territory which they wandered over; and their right to the
lands on which they hunted, could not be considered as superior to that which is
acquired to the sea by fishing in it. The use in the one case, as well as the other, is not
exclusive. According to every theory of property, the Indians had no individual rights to
land; nor had they any collectively, or in their national capacity; for the lands occupied
by each tribe were not used by them in such a manner as to prevent their being
appropriated by a people of cultivators. All the proprietary rights of civilized nations on
this continent are founded on this principle.
Id at 569-70. See also Carol M. Rose, PossessionAs the Oigin ofProperty, 52 U. Cf . L. REV. 73,
85-86 (1985) (discussing the implications of this argument in Johnson v M'Intosh). Chief
Justice Marshall did not specifically address M'Intosh's argument and instead relied on the
doctrine of discovery to decide that Indian tribes had the right to use and occupy their land
subject to the sovereign taking that land by either purchase or conquest. One wonders,
however, what impact the view of Indians as non-cultivators had on Marshall's reasoning. The
argument certainly had an impact on Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century. See
generallyJames R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the Aieican West: A New
Reservation Policy?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1, 14-15 (2001) (citing similar arguments from President
Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and others).
12 See supranote 8 (quoting Locke).
13 See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 947-48, 961 (1998) (discussing the evolution
of the states' application of the beneficial use doctrine both in the courts and the legislature).
14 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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the key question is whether the restricted or eliminated property right
originally "inhere[d] in the title."15 Thus, labeling the nineteenth century as
the century of capture suggests that many natural resource users have
indisputably good title to those resources because that their title depended
only upon capture. Under both Lucasand Penn CentralTransportationCo. v.
6
New York City,"
reallocation of a resource obtained under a rule of capture
is more likely to be a taking than reallocation of a resource that is not being
used in conformity with the terms of the grant. While it may be appealing to
reallocate resources away from an owner who took the resource under a
"primitive" capture rule that has now fallen out of favor, it is less just
because of its refusal to recognize reasonable reliance interests. Recognizing
this truth does not mean that the capture metaphor is never appropriate for
public land laws. It simply means that capture is a double-edged sword. In
the end, it seems wisest to carefully identify the reasonable reliance
interests associated with the ownership requirements of individual
resources.
In the sections that follow, the article will investigate the viability of the
capture metaphor for nineteenth century public land and resources law, and
then test the proposition that the metaphor is both over- and under-inclusive
by considering a rather obscure section of the 1866 mining law known as
R.S. 2477, which grants state and local governments "the right-of-way for the
construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses
....
1 Although R.S. 2477 was repealed with the passage of the Federal Land
Policy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976,18 FLPMA also promised to
preserve valid existing rights,' 9 meaning that any R.S. 2477 right-of-way
created prior to 1976 would not be lost. Given the vast number of potential
R.S. 2477 claims in the West-by one estimate, there are 10,000 R.S. 2477
roads in Utah alone'-this is no small matter. Moreover, because
designation of wilderness generally requires at least 5000 acres of roadless
lands, the presence of an R.S. 2477 road, particularly a road that can be
managed and improved by a state or local government, can preclude the
designation of wilderness. Thus, this "obscure" statute presents one of the
most significant potential limitations on wilderness designation in the West.
The actual impact of R.S. 2477 depends in large measure upon the
interpretation given to three statutory terms. Namely, what does the statute
"

15 Id. at 1015.

16 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
17 Mining Act of 1866 § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 ("An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and
Canal Owners over the Public Lands and for Other Purposes"). This statute was codified in 1873
in the Revised Statutes as section 2477 and subsequently recodified in 1934 as 43 U.S.C. § 932. It
was repealed with the passage of the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976. 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000) (Mining Act of 1866 repealed at 43 U.S.C. § 706(a)).
18 43 U.S.C. § 706(a).
19 See id. § 701(a) ("Nothing in this Act, or in any amendment made by this Act, shall be
construed as terminating any valid lease, permit, patent, right-of-way, or other land use right or
authorization existing on the date of approval of this Act."); see also id §§ 1769(a), 1701(h)
(protecting valid existing rights).
20 Stephen H.M. Bloch & Heidi J. McIntosh, A ViewFrbom the FrntLines:TheFate of Utah's
Redrock Wilderness Under the George W Bush Administration,33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 473,
489 (2003).
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mean when it refers to 1) "construction" of 2) "highways" over public lands
3) "not reserved for public uses"? While all three questions are important, it
is the meaning of "construction" upon which the article will focus.
Considering what sort of activities amounted to construction is a
particularly useful vehicle for analyzing the capture metaphor because the
question cuts across some of the typical conceptions of nineteenth century
public land law. With R.S. 2477, the environmental community, which is
often inclined to a capture view of the nineteenth century, finds itself
vigorously asserting an improvement rule requiring self-conscious,
mechanical construction.2 On the other side, states and rural counties, who
are typically more inclined to view the public land laws as rewarding
yeoman settlers for virtuously and diligently improving and cultivating a
hostile wilderness, find themselves asserting a "beaten path" standard of
ownership under which very little effort at improvement is necessary to
acquire title. Whether there are thousands of R.S. 2477 roads across the
public lands, as claimed by state and local governments, or many, many
fewer, as alleged by the environmental community, depends upon which of
these interpretations of the word "construction" prevails.
The article begins its analysis by considering in somewhat more detail
in Part II whether the rule of capture is an adequate metaphor for nineteenth
century public land law. Part III then provides the context for why R.S. 2477
matters as more than an abstract principle of vested rights. Specifically, this
part of the paper considers the concerns of the environmental community
that roads have dramatic negative ecological impacts and the concerns of
state and local governments that roads are an economic lifeline to rural
communities around the West. It also explains the relationship between
roads and wilderness that is the real driver of the R.S. 2477 debate. After
Part III provides the context for the roads issue, Part IV offers a relatively
brief analysis of the statute and of the current R.S. 2477 litigation. Part V
offers some concluding thoughts on R.S. 2477 and the rule of capture.
II. WAS THE NINETEENTH CENTURY REALLY THE CENTURY OF CAPTURE?
Although the rule of capture misses the mark as a metaphor for all of
nineteenth century natural resources law, it is on target with respect to
certain resources. As noted in the Introduction, capture rules typically
applied to fugacious (mobile) resources such as fish and wildlife where
ownership depended only upon capture of the resource. The capture rule
also prevailed in the case of underground resources like oil and groundwater
where pumping alone was enough to justify ownership.2 2 Under such pure
21 Ascribing a "capture view" to the entire environmental community paints with quite a
broad brush. Commentators have also recognized that the improvement and beneficial use
requirements of the nineteenth century tend to have an anti-environment bias because title
depends upon altering land's natural ecology to show "improvement." See, e.g., John G.
L.REV. 519, 521
Sprankling, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in American PropertyLaw, 63 U. CHm.
(1996) (asserting that a variety of common law property doctrines-waste, adverse possession,
possession as notice to a bona fide purchaser, good faith improver, trespass, and nuisanceresulted in an anti-wilderness bias).
22 See generally JAMES R. RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 779, 785
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capture rules, title to the resource did not depend upon improving the
resource in any way, nor did it depend upon using the resource for some
beneficial purpose and avoiding waste. Lockean sensibilities were satisfied
by the labor of acquisition, however slight.
These sorts of capture rules, of course, were not novel in the nineteenth
century, nor were they particularly rare. Characterized more broadly,
capture rules can be labeled as "rules of first possession." As Dean Lueck
remarks:
First possession rules are the dominant method of initially establishing
property rights. Such rules grant a legitimate ownership claim to the party that
gains control before other potential claimants. They have been applied widely
in both common and statute law, in such varied settings as abandoned
property, adverse possession, bona fide purchasing, the electromagnetic
spectrum, emissions rights, fisheries and wildlife, groundwater, hardrock
minerals, intellectual property, oil and gas, land, nonbankruptcy debt
collection, satellite orbits, spoils of war, treasure trove, and water rights....
Beyond the law, first possession rules are tightly woven into the fabric of
Anglo-American society, where they are better known as "finders keepers" or
"first come, first served," in cases ranging from retail customer service to street
parking to the use of office copiers. These rules are an important social
institution and are considerably more far-reaching than typically suggested by
the treasure trove and wild23 animal cases used by property law professors to
torment first-year students.
To label nineteenth century public land and natural resource laws as
rules of first possession is, perhaps, more accurate than labeling them as
rules of capture. Whereas capture is generally perceived as both the
necessary and sufficient condition for ownership, the rule-of-first-possession
label seems to contain greater allowance for the idea that first possession is
a necessary but insufficient condition for ownership. To that extent, it is a
more accurate description of nineteenth century public land and natural
resources law. Certainly it was the case that the first person to use a
particular resource had the best shot at title. Nevertheless, because first
possession was not necessarily enough for title, describing public land laws
as rules of first possession also runs the risk of ignoring the reality that title
more often also depended upon labor, cultivation, and improvement.
The idea that pure capture was not sufficient has a long pedigree in
public land and natural resources law. Before the Revolution, the Colonies
imposed a variety of conditions before a settler could take title to land.
Virginia, for example, required settlers to build a house; clear, plant, and
tend one acre; and keep stock for one year.24 In Massachusetts, settlers had
(2004) (discussing the rule of capture origins of groundwater law).
23 Dean Lueck, The Rule of FistPossessionandthe Design of the Law, 38 J. L. & ECON. 393,
393-94 (1995).
24 An Act for Seating and Planting (1666), reprintedin 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE

YEAR 1619, at 244 (William Wailer Hening, ed. 1823). See also AN ACT FOR ADJUSTING AND
SETTLING THE TITLES OF CLAIMERS TO UNPATENTED LANDS UNDER THE PRESENT AND FORMER

GOVERNMENT PREVIOUS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMONwEALTH's LAND OFFICE,

1779 Va.
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to build a house of a certain size and clear five acres fit for mowing and
tilling.25 This approach carried forward into the nineteenth century. Consider
just a few well-known public land laws. Under the 1841 Preemption Act,
before a settler could purchase land on which he had been residing, he had
to prove that he had "improv[ed]" the land and "erect[ed] a dwelling
thereon."26 Under the 1862 Homestead Act, to obtain a patent (essentially a
federal quitclaim deed) to 160 acres of public land, settlers had to show that
they had "resided upon or cultivated the [land] for the term of five
years.... "27 The 1873 Timber Culture Act allowed settlers to claim an
additional 160 acre quarter-section if they would "plant, protect, and keep in
a healthy, growing condition for ten years forty acres of timber."2 The 1877
Desert Land Act promised settlers in the arid west an additional 640 acres of
land, but only on the condition that they perform irrigation "to reclaim a
tract of desert land not exceeding one section."29 The 1872 Mining Act
required $100 of improvements each year for an unpatented mining claim
and $500 worth of labor before land could be taken to patent.3 Over and

Acts ch. 12, reprinted in 10

THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 40 (William Waller

Hening, ed. 1823) ("It is hereby declared, That no family shall be entitled to the allowance
granted settlers by this act, unless they have made a crop of corn in that country, or resided
there at least one year since the time of their settlement."). See geneaflyAMELIA CLEWLEY FORD,
COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF OUR NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM AS IT EXISTED IN 1800, at 103 (1910)
(discussing Virginia legislation).
25 See AN ACT FOR SEATING AND PLANTING, supra note 24. See also ALBERT T. VOLWILER,
GEORGE GROGHAN AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT 1741-1782, at 243 (1926) (recounting the
history of land grants in New York and noting that to discourage speculation and enable poor
immigrants to obtain land, the British Crown "declared a grant null and void unless a certain
proportion of the land was cultivated and settled within a reasonable period of time").
26 Proceeds of the Public Lands and Preemption Rights Act, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455
(1841).
27 Homestead Act, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
28 Timber of Western Prairies Act of 1873, ch. 277, § 1, 17 Stat. 1872, 1872-73 (1873).
29 Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377 (1877). Because much of the arid land west of
the Hundredth Meridian was unattractive for homesteading and preemption, Congress decided
to encourage irrigation by promising 640 acres at $1.25 per acre, rather than the usual 160 acres,
to anyone willing to irrigate the land within three years of filing. See RASBAND ET AL supra note
22, at 122.
30 Mining Resources Act, ch. 152, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 91, 93 (1872). For the first half of the
nineteenth century, mineral lands were open for sale and preemption just like other lands,
although in a few instances, the United States reserved or leased specified mineral lands. With
the discovery of gold in 1848 at Sutter's Mill on the American River in California, the issue of
what to do with public lands containing mineral resources became harder to ignore. In the
absence of federal law, the miners developed local associations and adopted rules governing
their claims. Their approach was largely confirmed by Congress in the 1872 General Mining Law
which still controls hard rock mining on the public lands. The Law provided that anyone who
found a valuable mineral deposit on the public lands, staked it out, and complied with local
notice and recording rules, was free to mine without paying the government anything. Although
a miner could take a claim to patent and obtain fee title to the surface, he did not need to do so.
As long as the miner fulfilled the obligation to actually work the claim, he had a protected
property interest in his unpatented mining claim. See generallyRASBAND ET AL., supra note 22, at
123-24.
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over again, these sorts of improvement and cultivation requirements appear
31
in public land law statutes.
In addition to requirements that the resource be cultivated and
"improved," natural resource laws imposed obligations that a captured
resource be used in a manner that was beneficial and not wasteful. Consider
the basic common law doctrine of beneficial use that governed water rights
in the prior appropriation states of the West. Under that doctrine, water
users could only obtain a right to the amount of water they put to beneficial
use.32 Although capture and first possession were necessary predicates to a
water right, they were not alone sufficient to establish title.
The examples of improvement and cultivation requirements are legion
and should give pause to the adoption of a capture metaphor, but they
should not be understood as proof that during the nineteenth century the
public's natural resources were only disposed of to those who satisfied these
criteria. As mentioned in the Introduction, even in those cases where the
laws required improvement, cultivation, or beneficial use, it was often the
case that such requirements were circumvented or ignored. This article will
not attempt to recount this saga of chicanery, but the following passage from
the work of historian Vernon Carstensen provides a useful synopsis of this
entertaining chapter in the legal history of the public lands.
The history of the public lands has been full of words such as speculators,
land monopolists, rings, corrupt officials, hush money, fraudulent entry, bogus
entrymen, land lawyers, land sharks. No doubt each new community in the
public land states, at one time, had its tales of the "innocent deceits" employed
to obtain land. The literal-minded eastern lawyer might regard the land-claim
association as a conspiracy to prevent open bidding at the land sale, but
westerners were inclined to view such associations as a necessary
accommodation to inept federal legislation. Few people in the lead country
31 See, e.g, Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 229 (requiring that a person with land claims
in Mississippi territory was obligated to actually settle and cultivate the land before land grants
from previous governments could be confirmed); Act of March 2, 1805, ch. 26, § 1, 2 Stat. 324-25
(confirming grants given by the French and Spanish in the Louisiana and Orleans territories to
anyone that inhabited and cultivated their grant before October 1, 1800); Act of March 3, 1807,
ch. 34, § 2, 2 Stat. 437, 438 (allowing persons who possessed, occupied, and improved land in
the Michigan Territory at time of passage of the act to obtain title to as much as 640 acres of
land); Act of February, 5, 1813, ch. 20, §1, 2 Stat. 797 (giving right of preemption to those who
had inhabited and cultivated land in the Illinois territory); Act of September 27, 1850, ch. 76, § 4,
9 Stat. 496, 497 (allowing settlers in Oregon territory to obtain 320 acres if single and 640 if
married, if they cultivated the land for four years); Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 2, 10 Stat. 308
(allowing male settlers over twenty-one in New Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska to obtain 160
acres if they settled and cultivated those acres for four years).
32 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (2003) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, measure
and limit to the use of water."). Under the historic rule of prior appropriation a water user could
obtain a vested water right by diverting water from a stream and putting that water to beneficial
use-irrigation, mining, domestic, industrial, etc. The use of the water not only had to be
beneficial in type but also reasonable in amount. In theory, water users were not entitled to
waste water by using more than they needed. To the extent a person used more water than was
necessary, the user would not obtain a vested right to the excess water. And if a water user
stopped using the water for a period of time, the user would abandon or forfeit her water right.
See generallyNeuman, supra note 13, at 923-946. (outlining the history of the beneficial use
doctrine).
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were disturbed by the story of blindfolding a witness and leading him across
land. He could then testify at the land office that he had been on the land and
had seen no sign of mineral deposits. A boy might stand on the number 21 and
answer truthfully, when asked by the land office official that he was indeed
over 21, and an eight- or ten-year-old girl might serve as a wife of record and so
give a man right to claim a double portion of land under the Oregon donation
law. A bucket of water poured out in a recently ploughed furrow or a shack
measured ininches not feet might be used in testimony as evidence of irrigation
or habitation. A group of lumbermen in the Puget Sound area was called into
court charged with timber theft. They were fined and also sentenced to one day
in jail. Their story, told again and again at the annual meetings of the
lumbermen's association, was that they paid their fines and then sent the sheriff
out for "segars" and potables. When he returned, lumbermen, sheriff, and judge
all retired to the jail, the key was turned in the lock, and all hands remained
incarcerated for the day. Thus were the demands of the law satisfied.

The land grabs, the water grabs, the mineral grabs, the timber grabs, all excite
great interest and bring forth lamentations. This represents a melancholy part
of the story, but it is not the whole story. The alienation of the public land
exhibits much human cunning and avarice, but in many instances what was
called fraud represented local accommodation to the rigidities and irrelevance
of the laws. The part of the story that involves the vast number of land-seekers
who got their land without violating either the spirit or the letter of the law is in
one way the least exciting part, but this is the part of the story that provided a
lure so strong that it drew millions of people across the Atlantic to the United
States in the hope of obtaining land. It was about this aspect that Eugene
Davenport, then Dean of the College of Agriculture of Illinois, might have been
thinking when in 1915 he discussed briefly the distribution and use of the public
domain. Waste and abuse there had been in abundance, "but we have these
farms, these cities, these railroads, and this civilization to show for it, and they
are worth what they cost."33
Despite the circumventions of improver and cultivation requirements in
public land laws, and despite the historical reluctance of states to enforce
beneficial use requirements in the water context,34 the capture metaphor
remains inadequate. As Carstensen's analysis suggests, the metaphor is

33 VERNON CARSTENSEN, THE PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

xxv-xxvi (Vernon Carstensen ed., 1968) (emphasis in original).
34 As Professor Neuman explained in her comprehensive article on beneficial use:
The requirement of "beneficial use without waste" sounds tight, as if water users must
carefully husband the resource, using every drop of water completely and efficiently to
avoid both forfeiture and waste. In actuality, the system is quite loose. Beneficial use is
in fact a fairly elastic concept that freezes old customs, allows water users considerable
flexibility in the amount and method of use, and leaves line drawing to the courts. The
prohibitions against waste-even the threat of forfeiture for nonuse-are mostly
hortatory concepts that rarely result in cutbacks in water use. In fact, there is
widespread agreement that there are significant inefficiencies in western water use, in
spite of these concepts of good husbandry that are built into the law.
Neuman, supranote 13, at 922.
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unduly critical of the many land-seekers and resource users who complied
with the terms of the law. And, as described in the Introduction, the image of
public resource users as mere capturers can improperly undermine and
subtly devalue the ownership claims of those who legitimately rely on
nineteenth century public land laws as the source of their title. Ironically, in
the takings context, it can also overvalue ownership interests by ignoring the
35
improvement or beneficial use requirements that inhere in the title.
Before turning to R.S. 2477 as a vehicle for considering the competing
nineteenth century metaphors of capturer and cultivator, it is necessary first
to consider some background about roads-their role in public land law and
why they matter to questions of preservation and environmental protection.
III. ROADS ON THE PUBLIc LANDS
A. FederalSupport of Road BuildingandRights-of-Way on the PublicLands
Although today the roads that crisscross our public lands are a source
36
of environmental concern for many, that has not always been the case.
During the nineteenth century, and even for much of the twentieth, roads
were viewed as an almost unqualified good. If America was to move West to
meet its "manifest destiny," it needed transportation infrastructure. And
Congress went about encouraging that infrastructure in just about every way
it could, subsidizing an array of roads, canals,37 railroads, and other "internal
improvements."38
The story of Congress' support for railroads is a familiar one. Early on,
Congress granted railroads a free right-of-way through public lands but the
right-of-way alone proved insufficient to stimulate entrepreneurs to
undertake the great task of extending railroads across the nation. The
builders pushed for a stronger incentive and Congress complied. In 1850,
Congress decided to subsidize the construction of the Illinois Central

35 See supranotes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing takings doctrine).
36 See infra Part IIl.B (discussing the impact of roads on the environment).
37 Early on in our nation's history the greater emphasis was probably on canals. See, e.g.,

Act of March 30, 1822, ch. 14, § 1, 3 Stat. 659 (granting Illinois a right-of-way for a canal from the
Illinois River to Lake Michigan); Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 165, § 1, 4 Stat. 47 (granting land to
Indiana to build and finance a canal connecting the Wabash and Miami rivers); Act of March 2,
1827, ch. 56, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 236 (granting land to Indiana for the construction and financing of a
canal from the Wabash River to Lake Erie); Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 73, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 474
(granting a right-of-way to Florida for the construction of a canal); Act of August 8, 1846, ch.
170, §§ 1-3, 9 Stat. 83 (granting land to Wisconsin for the construction and finance of a canal
linking the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers); Act of August 26, 1852, ch. 92, §§ 1-4, 10 Stat. 35-36
(granting a right-of-way to Michigan for a canal to circumvent St. Mary's Falls as well as 750,000
acres of land to finance the construction); Act of July 3, 1866, ch. 160, §§ 1-3, 14 Stat. 80-81
(granting Michigan land to build a canal to link Lake Superior with Lake La Belie); Act of July
28, 1868, ch. 228, §§ 1-5, 15 Stat. 169 (granting Minnesota land to build a dam and a lock to
improve the navigation of the Mississippi River, as long as the dam and lock were completed
within two years, and always remained public).
38 See generally CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND

RAILROADs 1800-1890 (1960) (documenting the many ways that all levels of government, in
cooperation with private interests, promoted canals and railroads).
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Railroad from Chicago to Mobile by granting Alabama, Mississippi, and
Illinois a 200 foot wide right-of-way and every even numbered section of
land for six sections on either side of the right-of-way, which the states
could sell to subsidize Illinois Central.39 In 1862, Congress promised the
Union Pacific and the Central Pacific railroads alternate sections of the
public land for a distance of ten miles, and then later twenty miles, on either
side of the track for the entire length of the transcontinental railroad.4" Then,
in 1864, the Northern Pacific Railroad (to be built from Duluth to Tacoma
and then Portland) was given the largest grant of all, alternate sections out
to 40 miles on each side of the railroad within territories and to 20 miles
within states, which amounted to approximately 45 million acres, an area
slightly larger than the state of Missouri. 41 A variety of other railroad grants
followed. By the time Congress ended railroad grants in 1871, railroad
corporations had received more than 94 million acres of land (a million
acres more than the entire acreage of Montana) and another 37 million acres
42
had been given to states for the specific benefit of railroads.
A part of the internal improvement story that often receives less
attention, however, is roads. Almost all of the early state enabling acts, for
example, contained specific "proceeds clauses," which provided that the
state would receive five percent of the income from federal land sales, which
the state was to spend on "public roads."4 3 Beginning with the famous

39 Act of September 20, 1850, ch. 61, §§ 1-7, 9 Stat. 466-67. Congress saw this approach as
more than a simple subsidy. As Congress envisioned it, the checkerboard grant assured that the
railroads would not hold a monopoly along the lands near the primary transportation route and
the presence of the railroad would allow the federal government to sell its own alternate
sections at a premium, effectively paying for the subsidy to the railroad. Although the finances
did not work out in practice, the approach continued. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K.
FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE PoLicY 20 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing rights-of-way granted by the
Act); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PuBLIc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 385-86 (1968) (summarizing
total grants to states and railroads from the federal government).
40 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, §§ 2-3, 12 Stat. 489, 491-92; See also DANA & FAIRFAX, supra
note 39, at 20; GATES, supranote 39, at 356-86 (providing a history of railroad land grants).
41 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 20
(regarding the Northern Pacific Railroad Grant); GATES, supra note 39, at 356-86 (explaining the
development of railroads in the west).
42 See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 20 (discussing specific acreage granted to the
railroads); See generallyGATES, supra note 39, at 356-86 (exploring the history of railroad land
grants).
43 The fu-st proceeds clause appeared in Ohio's enabling act, which provided that the state
would receive a percentage of sales proceeds for "laying out and making public roads" if the
state agreed not to tax any public lands sold by the United States for five years after their sale.
Enabling Act of 1802, ch. 40, § 7, 2 Stat. 173, 175 (1802). As Congress saw it, the transportation
infrastructure built with the proceeds clause "would at once enhance the value of the public
lands, and cement more strongly together the various interests of the confederacy." See O-o:
DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS AND CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION INTO THE UNION, REPORT NO. 161, 7th
Cong., at 341 (2d sess. 1803). These proceeds clauses, which later included authority to build
canals as well as roads, remained a fixture of state enabling acts until 1864. See 26 CONG. REC. 1,
218-20 (1893) (quoting the proceeds clauses from all states admitted to the Union as of that
date). Beginning with Nebraska in 1864, land sale proceeds were to be spent on schools. See
Nebraska Enabling Act, ch. 59, § 12, 13 Stat. 47, 49 (1864). The only partial exception to the pre1864 focus on roads was with Illinois' enabling act which required that two percent be spent on
internal improvements and three percent on "the encouragement of learning." Act of April 18,
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Cumberland National Road (between Cumberland, Maryland and the Ohio
River),44 Congress also routinely appropriated funds for the construction of
a wide variety of roads. 45 In some cases, Congress gave quite explicit
46
instructions about how the road was to be constructed. In the case of R.S.
2477, however, Congress was terse, providing no time limit and describing
no specific construction standards. Adding to the potential for future
confusion and litigation, R.S. 2477 grants were self-executing: claimants did
not need to apply for the right-of-way, notify the United States, or even
record their claim.4 7 A state or local government might thus assume that a
right-of-way had vested, while at the same time, the federal government
might plausibly assume that it had not.'
Although the turn of the nineteenth century saw a gradual movement
away from federal disposition of the public lands and toward federal
retention, that hardly altered the drive to build roads. If anything, it probably
increased it. The federal public land agencies could hardly authorize and
build roads fast enough, sometimes for recreation and visitation in the
national parks, but more often as necessary to access federal timber on
lands managed by the Forest Service. The result of federal policy in the
nineteenth and most of the twentieth century is that there are roads
everywhere on the public lands. "The current national forest road system
1818, ch. 67, § 6, 3 Stat. 428, 430 (1818).
44 Act of March 29, 1806, 2 Stat. 357.
45 See, e.g., Act of February 28, 1823, ch. 16, § 1, 3 Stat. 727 (granting 120 feet, plus another
mile on both sides, to Ohio for the construction of a road from the Miami River rapids to the
Connecticut Western Reserve); Act of March 2, 1827, ch. 52, § 1, 4 Stat. 234-35 (granting land to
Indiana to build a road from Lake Michigan to the Ohio River); Act of March 3, 1827, ch. 93, § 1,
4 Stat. 242 (granting land to Ohio to build and finance a road from Columbus to Sandusky).
46 With the Cumberland National Road, for example, Congress required that the middle of
the road be raised "with stone, earth, or gravel and sand... leaving or making... a ditch or
watercourse on each side... and in no instance shall there be an elevation in said road when
finished, greater than an angle of five degrees with the horizon." Act of March 29, 1806, ch. 20,
§ 4, 2 Stat. 357, 359. In the 1860s, Congress passed a number of statutes granting rights-of-way
that set forth specific construction requirements. See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 153, § 4, 13
Stat. 183, 184 (requiring the "road-bed proper to be not less than thirty-two feet wide, and
constructed with ample ditches on both sides .... All stumps and roots to be thoroughly
grubbed out between the ditches the entire length of said road; the central portion of which to
be sufficiently raised to afford a dry road-bed by means of drainage from the centre to the side
ditches.... ."); Act of July 5, 1866, ch. 174, § 3, 14 Stat. 89 ("said road shall be constructed with
such width, graduation, and bridges, as to permit its regular use as a wagon road .... ."); Act of
July 4, 1866, ch. 167, § 3, 14 Stat. 86 (using similar language to the Act of July 5, 1866).
47 The interpretation of R.S. 2477 grants as being self-executing is longstanding and widely
accepted. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 1988) ("According to
regulations issued by the Department of the Interior and, after 1946, the Bureau of Land
Management, a right-of-way could be obtained without application to, or approval by, the
federal government.") (citing 43 C.F.R. § 244.55 (1939)), overruledon othergrounds by Village
of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
48 In the absence of any specific process for resolving R.S. 2477 claims, there have been
various proposals to develop an administrative process to resolve disputes. For a helpful
recapitulation of those proposals, see Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage andR.S. 2477 Judicialand
AdministrativeResponsibilhty ForResolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523,
540-46 (2005). Professor Birdsong argues that federal land management agencies should have
primary responsibility to resolve R.S. 2477 claims with federal courts limited to their customary
administrative law role of reviewing the agency decision for abuse of discretion. Id
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includes 380,000 miles of road, enough road to circle the globe more than 15
times."49 BLM lands contain another 81,700 miles of roads, and wildlife
refuges and national parks contain 7,000 and 8,500 miles of roads
respectively.5" For a bit broader perspective on roads in the United States,
consider that there are 4 million miles of roads; 23 trillion vehicle miles were
traveled on those roads in 2002; there are an average of 253,000 animalvehicle accidents annually; and there are 1 million vertebrates run over each
day (a rate of one every 11.5 seconds).51
B. Roads and the Environment
All of these roads on the public lands have an impact on the
environment. Roads can displace species sensitive to disturbance or
dependent upon unbroken forest habitat; roads can create barriers to the
movement of certain animals; roads-or more precisely the vehicles that use
the roads-can spread non-native plants, animals, and insects; roadsparticularly dirt roads like those used for logging-can significantly increase
hillside erosion; the erosion, in turn, can introduce high sediment loads into
streams, reducing opportunities for fish to spawn and degrading the health
of aquatic ecosystems; and, as discussed at greater length below, roads bring
people and development into areas where they otherwise would not come.52
Perhaps the most important impact of roads on the environment is not
their impact on the environment per se, but their impact on the potential for
designating a particular area as wilderness. For an area to be designated as
wilderness, it must contain at least 5,000 roadless acres. 53 Thus, to the extent
49 National Forest System Roadless Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,306 (Oct. 19, 1999).
50 Department of the Interior, DOI Quick Facts, http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/orientation/facts2.
cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
51 Eliza Murphy, Caughtin the Headlights,HIGH COuNTRY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2005, at 9-11.
52 See generallyAYESHA ERCELAWN, END OF THE ROAD: THE ADVERSE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF

ROADS AND LOGGING: A COMPILATION OF INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED RESEARCH (1999) (discussing
different impacts of roads on the environment).
53 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-33 (2000). The Act defines wilderness "as an area
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain." Id § 1131(c). Wilderness must be
an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence,
without permanent improvements or human habitation [that] (1) generally appears to
have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive
and unconfined type of recreation; [and] (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is
of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired
condition.
Id. § 1131. Applying this standard, permanent and temporary roads are generally prohibited in
wilderness. Id. § 1131(c). Deciding what constitutes a road or what counts as a permanent
improvement has not been as straightforward as it may seem. The Forest Service, for example,
has identified areas with fences and water troughs as wilderness; and in the eastern United
States, where few areas would otherwise qualify, the Forest Service has said that areas which
contain no more than a half mile of improved road for each 1000 acres have wilderness
potential. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK

§ 1909.12, ch. 7 (1992). Congress, of course, is free to pass legislation designating an area as
wilderness regardless of its physical characteristics. Nevertheless, as a working description, the
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an area of the public lands contains an R.S. 2477 road, particularly where
that road can be maintained or upgraded by a state or county government,
that area is unlikely to be designated by Congress as wilderness.
Although the Wilderness Act was passed in 1964, the question of what
public lands should be designated as wilderness is not yet close to
resolution. This is particularly the case with respect to lands managed by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), but also to a lesser degree with national
forests. As initially enacted, the Wilderness Act designated as wilderness
only 9.1 million acres of land that had previously been set aside by the
Forest Service as "wilderness," "wild," or "canoe" areas.54 In addition, the
Act provided for a review, to be completed within ten years, of the
wilderness potential of all the areas within the national forests that had
previously been designated as "primitive areas," as well as a review of "every
roadless area of five thousand contiguous acres or more in the national
parks, monuments and other units of the national park system and every
such area of, and every roadless island within, the national wildlife refuges
and game ranges...." 55 BLM lands-"the land no one wanted"56 -were not
mentioned in the Wilderness Act and their review only began in 1976 with
the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 57 (FLPMA) and
its requirement of a wilderness review.
The wilderness identification process within national parks and wildlife
refuges was not particularly controversial because wilderness is not a
dramatic departure from the existing preservation mandate for those land
systems. However, for national forests and BLM lands, the process has been
much more contentious because those lands would otherwise be available
for multiple uses, which include logging, grazing, mining and other
extractive and commodity uses, as well as high-intensity, motorized
recreation.
The full story of wilderness designation on national forest lands is well
beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that one of the major
themes of the entire national forest wilderness story-from the initial
roadless area reviews and evaluations (RARE I during the Nixon
administration and RARE II during the Carter administration) to the current
requirements that an area be roadless, at least 5000 acres, and without permanent
improvements provide a fairly objective baseline for which areas may even be considered as
wilderness. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 22, at 613-14 (discussing the Wilderness Act
definition of wilderness and the process of designating wilderness).
54 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
.55 Id § 1132(c). As a result of the various reviews, Congress began adding wilderness. "The
greatest expansion of the system came as a result of the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA) which created 35 new wilderness areas in Alaska totaling more
than 56 million acres." See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 22, at 613. Today, the National
Wilderness Preservation System contains 662 areas totaling 105.6 million acres. The National
Wilderness Preservation System, Wilderness Fast Facts, http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?
fuse=NWPS&sec=fastFacts (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (providing facts about the wilderness
areas in the United States). For a clickable map identifying all of these wilderness areas
including descriptions and photographs, see The National Wilderness Preservation System,
Wilderness Areas, http://www.wilderness.netindex.cfm?fuse=NWPS (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
56 DYAN ZAsLOwsKY &T.H. WATIGNS, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 135 (2d ed. 1994).
57 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
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tussle over the Bush administration's changes to the Clinton administration's
roadless area rule-is that whether an area may be designated as wilderness
depends upon whether the area can be classified as roadless.58 Nevertheless,
the debate about roads in our national forests is not just, or even primarily,
about R.S. 2477. Whether additional roads should be built to facilitate timber
harvests within our national forests is a major issue.5 Moreover, the debate
about R.S. 2477 is less significant in the case of national forests than with
BLM lands. Because R.S. 2477 granted rights-of-way across only those public
lands not otherwise reserved for a particular public use, 60 once a national
forest was created no more R.S. 2477 rights-of-way could be established on
that "reserved" land. Given the early date at which most forests were
reserved, fewer roads had been constructed and proving the pre-reservation
existence of those few roads after so many years is quite difficult.
BLM lands, which have never been reserved for a specific purpose, are
a different story. In 1976 Congress passed FLPMA and instructed BLM to
conduct a wilderness review of the lands it managed.
Within fifteen years after October 21, 1976, the Secretary shall review those
roadless areas of five thousand acres or more and roadless islands of the public
lands, identified during the inventory required by section 1711(a) of this title as
having wilderness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act... and shall
from time to time report to the President his recommendation as to the
suitability or nonsuitability of each such area or island for preservation as
wilderness .... 61

One of the linchpins of the current wilderness debate came in the next part
of section 603. There, Congress provided that the areas identified by the
Secretary of the Interior as potential wilderness (what are typically called
"wilderness study areas" or "WSAs") were to be managed by the Secretary,
and therefore the BLM, for non-impairment of their wilderness
characteristics until Congress decides to designate the WSAs as part of the
wilderness preservation system or release them for multiple use
management. 2
R.S. 2477 roads can impact wilderness study areas in a few key ways.
First, in determining whether an area was roadless and could be labeled a
WSA, BLM defined the term "roadless" to mean an area without any roads
built by mechanical means. If it turns out that rural counties are correct and
58 For a review of the controversy over wilderness designation in the national forests, see
generally RASBAND ET AL., supranote 22, at 614-15, 1216-24.
59 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area
Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2004) (discussing
the history of Forest Service roadless initiatives and the differing approaches of the Clinton and
Bush administrations); Martin Nie, Adminitrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The
Forest Service Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 687, 699 (2004) (discussing the history of
national forest roads and noting that "[s]ince RARE H was completed in 1979, roads had been
constructed in an estimated 2.8 million acres of inventoried roadless lands").
60 Act of July 26, 1866, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 ("That the right of way for the construction of
highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.").
61 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
62 Id. § 1782(c).
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that any "beaten path" is a road, the WSAs could actually be laced with
roads. One might respond that if the physical, on-the-ground characteristics
of the "beaten path" did not preclude calling an area "roadless" in the initial
inventory, why does it matter if that same "path" is later labeled an R.S. 2477
road? The answer is that if a bona fide right-of-way exists in a "beaten path,"
it is subject to state or county improvement and upgrading. Although WSAs
are to be managed for non-impairment, WSA management is subject to valid
existing rights.6 Thus, the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way can limit
the agency's ability to manage the WSA for non-impairment of its wilderness
characteristics. Even if a road would not preclude wilderness designation in
its current state, it could after a local government improved its existing rightof-way.
Although at first glance R.S. 2477 may not seem particularly significant,
before its 1976 repeal it may have created thousands of rights-of-way across
the public lands, which are laced with everything from graded and
maintained county roads between ranching communities to rutted jeep trails
leading to abandoned uranium mines and old, leaky water tanks. Utah and
its counties, for example, claim some 10,000 potential R.S. 2477 roads.6
Other state and local governments have similarly significant potential
claims. San Bernardino County, California, has claimed
4,986 miles of "highways," 2,567 of which are in the Mojave National Preserve,
protected by the California Desert Protection Act of 1994. In Colorado, Moffatt
County officials have claimed a spiderweb of trails in Dinosaur National
Monument. In Alaska, the state has claimed that nearly 900,000 miles of section

63 Discovering additional roads outside wilderness study areas could also limit the potential
for more wilderness designations. Because they view BLM's initial inventory of its lands for
roadless areas with wilderness characteristics as inadequate, various preservation organizations
have conducted their own inventories and identified additional areas that they claim are
roadless and possess wilderness characteristics. See James R. Rasband, Utah s GrandStaircase:
The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation?70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483, 492-98 (1999) (discussing

the citizen-led wilderness inventory effort). In Utah, the Clinton administration reinventoried
the citizen-identified lands and decided that roughly 2.6 million acres had potential wilderness
characteristics. See Sarah Krakoff, Settling the Wilderness, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1159, 1167-78
(2004) (considering Utah's settlement on the management of wilderness inventory areas). The
Clinton BLM then began to manage these "wilderness inventory areas" for non-impairment as if
they were wilderness study areas. See generally RASBAND ET AL, supra note 22, at 661-64

(discussing this debate over the reinventory in Utah). The Bush administration, by way of
settling a lawsuit with the State of Utah, concluded that only areas identified in the original
FLPMA section 603 wilderness inventory could be managed as wilderness study areas and that
other BLM lands had to be managed in accordance with existing land use plans, which called
for the citizen-identified areas to be managed for multiple use rather than for non-impairment.
See Sarah Krakoff, Settlng the Wildemess, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1159, 1161-74 (2004)
(considering Utah's settlement on the management of wilderness inventory areas). The
environmental community's challenge to the Utah wilderness settlement is currently before the
federal district court in Utah. See Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 2005)
(dismissing appeal as interlocutory because cross-claims were still pending before the district
court).
64 Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 20, at 489 (citing congressional testimony from a
representative of the Utah Association of Counties).
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lines (used for survey
purposes) with no apparent surface manifestation, are
65
R.S. 2477 highways.
If all of these count as R.S. 2477 roads, it not only limits the potential for
wilderness, but it also creates the potential for tremendous management
conflicts when the state, local, or federal entity claiming the right-of-way
wants to modify or expand a road. Both are reasons for opposition from the
environmental community. In its view, most of the so-called "roads" are
really just abandoned mining trails, dry stream bottoms, and off-road vehicle
routes, some of which are not even visible on the ground.6
C. The Benefits of Road Building
The variety of environmental concerns about roads should not be taken
too far. Roads are not an unadulterated evil whose primary purpose is to
harm the environment and limit wilderness. On the contrary, roads bring a
variety of benefits that we all enjoy. As George Bernard Shaw once
remarked, "what Englishman will give his mind to politics as long as he can
afford to run a motorcar."67 Most of us benefit from the country's vast
transportation infrastructure. Roads create opportunities for economic
development. They open up access to recreation opportunities that would
otherwise be unavailable to all but a few. And for rural communities
surrounded by a sea of public lands, roads are seen as an economic lifeline,
providing access to markets, gas and mining development, grazing
allotments, and recreational sites, as well as routes for off-road vehicle use."
Roads are also important for emergency, medical, and law enforcement
needs in rural areas. While backpackers may not appreciate the whine of an
automobile breaking the canyon stillness, that same vehicle sounds very
different to the hiker injured and waiting for help.
IV. UNTANGLING R.S. 2477
If one cares about wilderness designation, about the ecological impact
of roads more generally, or about the need to assure a transportation
infrastructure for rural public land communities, R.S. 2477 matters. The key
question then is what Congress intended to grant when it stated in R.S. 2477
"[tihat the right-of-way for the construction of highways over public lands,
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. ""9 Like most interpretive
65 Id at 490 (internal citations omitted).
66 Id For pictures of some of the more dubious R.S. 2477 claims, see Southern Utah

Wilderness Alliance, Campaigns, http://www.suwaorg/page.php? page-id=95 (last visited Nov.
20, 2005).
67 See MARK NICHOLSON & MARK WHEATLEY, MARKET DRIVERS: ENDING ROAD RATIONING AND

REFINING THE TRANSPORT MARKET 13 (2003), availableathttp://www.bowgroup.org/pub/bRR15.
pdf.
68 Wilderness and preservation, of course, also have economic value. See generally Pete
Morton, The Economic Benefits of Wilderness: Theory and Practice, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 465
(1999) (considering both the market and non-market values of wildlands).
69 Mining Act of 1866 § 8, 14 Stat. 253 (1866).
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questions of consequence, there is significant disagreement about exactly
what Congress intended when it enacted R.S. 2477. The disagreement runs
along two axes. First, there is a question about whether Congress intended
state or federal law to define the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.
Second, there is a question, under either state or federal law, about what
actions are necessary to show "construction" of a "highway" on public lands
"not reserved for public use."7M At a more basic level, the debate about the
meaning of R.S. 2477 is one of competing metaphors. The question is
whether R.S. 2477 is a rule of capture or a rule of improvement.
A.R.S.2477 Federalor State Law?
To the casual observer, the question whether state or federal law
governs the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way may seem curious. If R.S.
2477 is a federal law, surely its interpretation must be a matter of federal
law. At one level, this is indisputably true. Ultimately, it is the intent of
Congress, and not the actions of a particular state legislature, that must give
content to R.S. 2477. Yet, it is also possible for Congress, as a matter of
federal law, to decide that state law should govern the resolution of a
particular dispute or entitlement. Consider other areas of public land law. In
the same 1866 mining law containing R.S. 2477, Congress provided that
rights to water acquired by prior appropriation were good against
subsequent federal patentees if the rights were "recognized and
acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and decisions of courts."71 In the
Mining Law of 1872, Congress invited states and local authorities to establish
rules for mining claims as long as those rules were "not in conflict with the
laws of the United States."72 Likewise, in the Desert Land Act, Congress
law would govern the allocation of waters on much of the
decided that state
73
public domain.
Thus, it would not be extraordinary for Congress to have intended the
existence and scope of R.S. 2477 roads to be resolved with reference to state
law. If Congress was willing to let states decide the fate of water and
minerals on the public domain, perhaps it was also willing to allow states to
decide on road ownership. On the other hand, there have always been limits
on how far states can go in allocating natural resources on the public lands

70 Id
71 Id

72 Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, 28. A claimant's failure to comply with state
procedures may be grounds for cancellation of the claim by the federal government. See
Roberts v. Morton, 389 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D. Colo. 1975) (explaining the requirements of
exploration and mining of lands belonging to the United States), aiTd,549 F.2d 158, 161-62
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom., Roberts v. Andrus, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); U.S. v. Weber Oil
Co., 89 Interior Dec. 538, 548, GFS (MiIN) 306 (1982) (holding that state and local laws apply to
mining claimants).
73 See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-164
(1935) (stating that "following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part
of the public domain became publicijuris,subject to plenary control of the designated states...
with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the
common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain").
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and surely that must also be true of roads. Thus, in the mining context,
Congress may have been willing to allow states to decide how claims had to
be marked and recorded, and the amount of work on a claim that had to be
completed. Congress, however, still required that the state laws not be "in
conflict" with federal law,74 and that the miner actually locate a "valuable
mineral deposit." 75 Staking a mining claim to a fantastic trout-fishing spot
was not enough, no matter what a state may have thought. Similarly,
although Congress may have severed the water from the public domain in
the Desert Land Act, 76 Congress has continued to regulate that water-for
example, with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 77 or the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 7 8-and, when necessary, the United States has asserted
79
reserved rights to water for Indian and other federal reservations.
While Congress has at various times assigned to states the authority to
dictate ownership rules for resources on the public domain, a minimum of
two conditions have still applied to the resource. First, the resource has
always remained subject to federal constitutional authority. Second, some
reasonable limit on state authority over a resource on the public lands was
implicit in the statutory scheme. Thus, for example, even if Congress
intended for the states to decide on the existence and scope of an R.S. 2477
right-of-way, surely a state could not have passed a state law declaring that
the builder of any road across the public lands was entitled to a three-mile
wide right-of-way. Presumably, the Desert Land Act was not intended to
allow a state to pass a law allowing one private company to appropriate all
of the water in the state for speculative purposes. Although the Mining Law
provided only that "not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or
improvements made during each year,"80 presumably a requirement that a
miner perform $100,000 of labor each year would have been held contrary to
the broader federal purposes sought to be achieved with the mining law.
Thus, even when a federal statute allows states to allocate a federal
resource, it seems implicit in that grant of authority that the state's
allocation decision be reasonable and consonant with broader statutory
purposes.
74 Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, 28.
75 Id. §§ 22, 29.
76 See California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 158 (concluding that the Desert Land Act
"effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from
the land itself"). Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (repealed 1976).
77 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
78 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
79 See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955) (holding that despite the
long understanding of Desert Land Act states in the West that water use would be governed by
state law, see supra note 73, the Desert Land Act did not apply to federal reservations where
water was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation). As one commentator points
out, decisions like FederalPower Comm'n v. Oregon indicate that "it is not at all unusual for
federal courts to interpret federal statutes in a manner inconsistent with prior state law which
remained unchallenged for a long period of time by federal authorities." Pamela Baldwin,
Ilgh way Rights of Way on PublicLands. R.S. 2477 andDisclaimers of Interes4 Congressional
Research Service, Report for Congress, RL32142, Nov. 7, 2003, at 40 n.148 (quoting Dept. of
Justice amnicus brief in Alaska Greenhouses Inc. v. Anchorage (Civ. A85-630, (D. Alaska 1986)).
80 30 U.S.C. § 28.
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1. Pre-FLPMA Interpretationof R.S. 2477
With that preface in mind, how has R.S. 2477 been interpreted over the
years? The starting place for statutory interpretation is, of course, the
language of R.S. 2477 itself. The terse statutory language, however, does not
indicate whether the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is to be
determined by state or federal law. R.S. 2477 requires "construction of
highways" but are those terms to be defined by reference to state or federal
law? And, if by state law, what range of definitions can be described as
reasonably within the broader purposes of the statute? Recall that R.S. 2477
was enacted as part of the 1866 mining law. As the Tenth Circuit has noted:
Congress explicitly adopted state or local law as the rule of decision
for sections 1, 2, 5, and 9 of the 1866 Act; just as explicitly, Congress
asserted the applicability of federal laws or regulations in sections 7,
10, and 11. The silence of section 8 reflects the probable fact that 81
Congress simply did not decide which sovereign's law should apply.
Where the statute itself is silent or ambiguous, courts typically defer to the
interpretation of the statute offered by the federal agency charged with
implementing the statute.8 2 This is where things get a bit more complicated.
Between 1866 and 1898, the Department of the Interior did not issue any
guidance on R.S. 2477. In 1898, the Secretary of the Interior ruled against a
county's attempt to accept R.S. 2477 grants to the extent of 30 feet alongside
all section lines in the county. 3 Although the Secretary's 1898 decision did
not specifically address whether state or federal law governed the meaning
of R.S. 2477, 4 the decision can be understood as an example of a federal law
Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (1988).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As the Court
stated in Chevron.
81
82

The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created...
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Id at 843-44 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
83 Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 446,447 (1898). The court remarked:
There is no showing of either a present or a future necessity for these roads or that any
of them have been actually constructed, or that their construction and maintenance is
practicable. Whatever may be the scope of the statute under consideration it certainly
was not intended to grant a right of way over public lands in advance of an apparent
necessity therefor, or on the mere suggestion that at some future time such roads may be
needed.
Id.at 447.
84 The Secretary's reasoning did hint that state law could determine the existence of a rightof-way:
If public highways have been, or shall hereafter be, established across any part of the
public domain, in pursuance of law, that fact will be shown by local public records of
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reasonableness limit on the scope of an R.S. 2477 grant. If section lines were
held to be valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, an incredibly extensive crosshatched grid of roads (with rights-of-way established at one-mile intervalsnorth, south, east, and west) across federal lands would be created.85
It was not until 1938 that the Interior Department published a regulation
dealing with R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.8 6 The regulation simply provided: "This
grant becomes effective upon the construction or establishing of highways,
in accordance with the state Jaws, over public lands not reserved for public
uses. No application should be filed under the act, as no action on the part of
the Federal Government is necessary."87 The Department of the Interior
adhered to this basic position until FLPMA's passage in 1976.
In the meantime, state courts went about adopting their own
approaches to R.S. 2477. Some state courts-Kansas, South Dakota, and
Alaska-in opposition to the 1898 decision of the Solicitor, upheld state
statutes which created rights-of-way along all section lines regardless of
construction or use.89 Other states, including Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New
Mexico, and Oregon, provided that public use of a road over time could
establish a highway. 90 Arizona, by contrast, decided that R.S. 2477 rights-ofwhich all must take notice, and the subsequent sale or disposition by the United States of
the lands over which such highways are established will not interfere with the authorized
use thereof, because those acquiring such lands will take them subject to any easement
existing by authority of law.
Id.at 447.
85 Despite this ruling, several states have dedicated all section lines as public roads. See U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON R.S. 2477: THE HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS 15 (1993). This is not quite as
odd as it may seem. As one commentator explains:
The American surveying system did not provide for road corridors along section lines. In
contrast to the American system, the Canadian system expressly did provide for road
corridors along all section and township lines. Some states adopted the Canadian
approach and specified that rights of way existed along section lines.
Baldwin, supra note 79, at 46-47.
86 Regulations Governing Rights-of-Way, 56 Interior Dec. 533, 551 (1938).
87 Id.

88 The actual regulation in effect at FLPMA's passage had been published in 1970 and
amended in 1974. Effective Date of Grant, Roads Over Public Lands Under R.S. 2477, 35 Fed.
Reg. 9645, 9647 (June 13, 1970), as amended at 39 Fed. Reg. 39,440 (Nov. 7, 1974). It addressed
the management of rights-of-way in more detail than the 1938 regulation but it retained the
same basic position that grants became effective upon construction or establishment of
highways in accordance with state law. Id
89 See Letter from Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor, to James W. Moorman,
Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 28, 1980) (hereafter "Ferguson Letter"). In 2000, North
Dakota's Attorney General issued an opinion that all federal land in North Dakota was burdened
with an R.S. 2477 right-of-way along all section lines. 2000 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 05 (Jan. 26,
2000), available at2000 WL 146636.
90 Ferguson Letter, supra note 89 at 3, (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court
explained:
[D]ecisions are to the effect that an acceptance is shown by evidence of user for such a
length of time and under such conditions as would establish a road by prescription, if the
land over which it passed had been the subject of private ownership. Okanogan Co. v.
Cheetham, 37 Wash. 682, 80 P. 262, 70 LR. A. 1027; City of Butte v. Mikosowitz, 39 Mont.
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way could be created only
by local government resolution following
9
construction of a highway. 1
Despite this ongoing litigation, it is fair to say that for much of its
history the interpretation of R.S. 2477 was not a particularly pressing issue
for public land management. Most of the litigation was between private
landowners and neighbors who sought to cross the landowner's property
along what they alleged to be an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. Moreover, because
no application needed to be filed or recorded to effectuate a grant, and
because the federal government did little to hinder state, county, and private
access across the public domain, there was little occasion to fight about
whether an R.S. 2477 right-of-way had been established as against the United
States. With the passage of FLPMA in 1976, however, the meaning of R.S.
2477 became much more important. Culminating what had been a centurylong movement toward federal retention of the public lands, FLPMA
declared Congress's intention that the "public lands be retained in Federal
ownership, unless as a result of the land use planning procedure provided
for in this Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve
the national interest...."9 2 Although FLPMA's multiple use mandate lacked
the preservation focus of other legislation such as the Wilderness Act93 and
the National Park Service Organic Act94, FLPMA refocused the dialogue
about the appropriate management of the BLM's lands and therefore about
the meaning of R.S. 2477. Particularly in light of FLPMA's command that
BLM perform a wilderness inventory of its lands and then manage
wilderness study areas for non-impairment, 95 FLPMA energized a
constituency for a new and narrower interpretation of R.S. 2477. Because
FLPMA also repealed R.S. 2477,96 while protecting R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in
existence on the date of the Act's passage, 97 it also made clear that there was

350, 102 P. 593, or of public user for such time as is prescribed in state statutes upon
which highways are deemed public highways. McRose v. Bottyer, 81 Cal. 122, 22 P. 393;
Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P. 448; Walcott Tp. v. Skauge, 6 N.D. 382, 71
N.W. 544; Great N. R. Co. v. Viborg, 17 S.D. 374, 97 N.W. 6. See, also, annotation on
necessity and sufficiency of acceptance, L.R.A. 1917A, 355.
Lindsay Land & Livestock v. Chumos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1930).
91 Ferguson Letter, supm note 89, at 9 (citations omitted).
92 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1)(2000). FLPMA repealed
scores of old public lands laws and served as an organic act for BLM, directing that the grazing
and other lands managed by BLM, like the national forests, should be managed "under the
principles of multiple use and sustained yield" for a range of uses including extraction,
recreation, and preservation, a philosophy commonly called multiple use and sustained yield
that had originally been championed by Gifford Pinchot. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) (setting
forth the multiple use standard). BLM now administers about 180 million acres of land in the
lower 48 states and another 86 million acres in Alaska. See BLM, Lands Managed by the BLM,
http://www.blim.gov/nhp/facts/maps/landsmap-m.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (depicting the
lands managed by the BLM).
93 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et.seq. (2000).
94 National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. § 81 et. seq. (2000).
95 See infraPartIII.B.
96 See supranote 19 (citing statutory provisions regarding valid existing rights).
97 See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1769(a), 1701(a), (h) (2000)
(protecting valid existing rights).
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a need to identify and recognize whatever rights existed as of 1976 so that
title and management authority could be clarified. In basic terms, FLPMA
started a political tug-of-war over the meaning of R.S. 2477. That tug-of-war
is a classic, although not particularly uncommon, tale of the ebb and flow of
administrative law over the course of successive presidential
administrations.
2. The CarterYears
The first change in direction on R.S. 2477 policy came toward the end of
the Carter administration. In 1980, the Solicitor's office issued a letter
offering what it regarded as the proper substantive interpretation of R.S.
2477.98 Deputy Solicitor Ferguson's letter concluded that "whether a
particular highway has been legally established under R.S. 2477 remains a
question of federal law."99 And, as a matter of federal law, the word
"construction" in the statute meant that "in order for a valid right-of-way to
come into existence, there must have been the actual building of a highway;
i.e., the grant could not be perfected without some actual construction."100
"Mere use" was not sufficient; the word "construction" "implies the
performance of work."10' The interpretation, it noted, also had the virtue of
"avoiding what would otherwise be a serious conflict between highway
2477 and the meaning of the term
rights-of-way established under R.S.
0l 2
'roadless' in Section 603 of FLPMA."

98 See Ferguson Letter, supranote 89. The so-called Ferguson letter had been preceded, in
1979, by proposed Interior Department regulations that would have required state or local
governments to file maps with the BLM within three years showing the location of highways
constructed under R.S. 2477. The filing was not to be conclusive evidence of an R.S. 2477 road
but only a means whereby BLM would be able to note the public land records. 43 C.F.R. §
2802.3-6 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 58,118 (Oct. 9, 1979). When the final regulations were published,
however, they simply stated that that there was an opportunity to file within three years. 43
C.F.R. § 2802.3-6 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 44,518, 44,531 (July 1, 1980). Then, when new regulations
were published by the Reagan Interior Department in 1982, the three-year window was
removed. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.5 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 12,568-70 (Mar. 23, 1982).
99 Ferguson Letter, supra note 89, at 4.
100 Ferguson Letter, supranote 89, at 5.
101 .Ferguson Letter, supra note 89, at 5-6. One precedent that seemed to have particular
influence on the view of the Solicitor's Office was the line of cases holding that grants by the
federal government were to be construed favorably to the government and that nothing should
be conveyed in the absence of clear and explicit language. Id. at 4 (citing Caldwell v. United
States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1918); Wisconsin Central R.R. Co. v. United States, 164 U.S. 190, 202
(1898); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942); Andrus v. Charlestone
Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978)).
102 Ferguson Letter, supra note 89, at 2. The definition of road employed by the BLM in
performing its section 603 inventory came from the House Report on FLPMA:
The word "roadless" refers to the absence of roads which have been improved and
maintained by mechanical means to insure relatively regular and continuous use. A way
maintained solely by the passage of vehicles does not constitute a road.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, at 17 (1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175. As explained above,
see supra text accompanying note 63, if "beaten path" roads are valid R.S. 2477 roads, then
WSAs determined with reference to a mechanical construction standard could actually be laced
with roads subject to local government improvement, which presumably would preclude
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3. The Reagan Years
The conclusions in the Ferguson letters were finally tested during the
Reagan administration, in what became known as the Burr Trail case, Sierra
Club v. Hodel.°3 As described by the court, the Burr Trail runs through a
spectacular portion of Utah's red rock country, and
the road at various points traverses across or next to unreserved federal lands,
two wilderness study areas, the Capitol Reef National Park, and the Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area. The trail has hosted a variety of uses: during
the late 1800s and early 1900s to drive cattle, sheep and horses to market;
around 1918 to facilitate oil exploration; and since the 1930s for various
transportation, emergency, mineral, agricultural, economic development, and
tourist needs. Garfield
County (the County) has maintained the Burr Trail since
4
the early 1940s.'1

In light of this historic use and maintenance, the Sierra Club did not contest
the existence of the right-of-way on appeal, but instead challenged its scope,
contesting Garfield County's plan to expand the western 28 miles of the road
from one lane to two and then to gravel the expanded portion."10 The Tenth
Circuit gave the Ferguson letter its narrowest possible reading, reasoning
that whatever the merits of applying a federal "construction" standard to the
question of the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, it was "most
consonant with reason and precedent" that state law should control the
06
scope of the right-of-way. 1
Following the Tenth Circuit's decision, President Reagan's Interior
Secretary Donald Hodel issued a new policy statement on R.S. 2477.107 The
so-called "Hodel Policy" confirmed that the scope of rights-of-way was to be
resolved by reference to state law. 08 It then rejected the Ferguson letter's
definition of "construction." Without addressing whether the existence of an
R.S. 2477 right-of-way was a question of state or federal law, the policy
provided that

wilderness designation.
103 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on othergrounds byVillage of Los Ranchos De
Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
104 Id at 1073.
105 Id.. The fact that the Sierra Club in the district court challenged the existence of any rightof-way along the Burr Trail illustrates that both sides in the R.S. 2477 debate have taken the
most aggressive position possible.
106 Id at 1080-81. The court did not address whether federal law should decide the existence
of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. It did note that over the prior 125 years, "each western state has
developed its own state-based definition of the perfection or scope of the R.S. 2477 grant, either
by explicitly declaring R.S. 2477 to incorporate state law or by simply expounding its own law."
Id.
at 1082.
107 Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Sec'y for Fish and Wildlife and Parks and the
Assistant Sec'y for Land Mgmt. to the Sec'y of the Interior Regarding Departmental Policy on
Section 8 of the Act of July 26, 1866, Revised Statute 2477 (Repealed), Grant of Right-of-Way for
Public Highways (RS-2477) (Dec. 7, 1988) (hereinafter "Hodel Policy"), avabiable at
http://www.rs2477roads.com/2hodel.htm.
108 Hodel Policy, supm note 107, at 3.
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Construction is a physical act of readying the highway for use by the public
according to the available or intended mode of transportation-foot, horse,
vehicle, etc. Removing high vegetation, moving large rocks out of the way, or
filling low spots, etc., may be sufficient as construction for a particular case.

Road maintenance over several years may equal actual construction.
09

The passage of vehicles by users over time may equal actual construction. 1

The Hodel decision also proved to be quite influential in the courts. In
subsequent years, a number of federal district courts cited Hodeland offered
varying degrees of analysis to adopt a state law, "continued use" standard for
the existence of an R.S. 2477 claim. 10
4. The Clinton Years
With the advent of the Clinton Administration, federal R.S. 2477 policy
took another U-turn. In 1994, the Clinton Administration Department of the
Interior proposed new R.S. 2477 regulations."' The proposed rules would
have established a federal administrative procedure for determining the
validity of R.S. 2477 claims.1 2 They also returned to the construction
standard of the Ferguson letter, defining construction as a matter of federal
law to be "an intentional physical act or series of intentional physical acts
that were intended to, and that accomplished, preparation of a durable,
observable, physical modification of land for use by highway traffic." 3
The proposed rules, however, were never finalized because soon after
the Republicans took control of Congress in 1994, Congress imposed a
temporary moratorium on further Interior Department R.S. 2477
regulations, 4 which was followed the next year by a permanent
109 Hodel Policy, supra note 107, at 3. The Policy also called for the land management
bureaus within the Interior Department to develop procedures for administratively recognizing
highways for purposes such as developing land use plans. Id at 2.
110 See Barker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of La Plata, Colo., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D.
Colo. 1999); United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 235-36 (D. N.M. 1992), affd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994); Adams v. United States, 687 F.
Supp. 1479, 1490 (D. Nev. 1988). See also Shultz v. United States Dept. of the Army, 10 F.3d 649,
655 (9th Cir. 1993), withdrawnandsupersededon rehearing,96 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1996).
111 Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (Aug. 1, 1994) (to be codified at
43 C.F.R. pt. 39).
112 Id at 39,226-29.
113 Id.
at 39,225. In an advanced notice of a proposed rulemaking, announced the same day,
the Interior Department also solicited comments on management standards for R.S. 2477 rightsof-way. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59
Fed. Reg. 39,228 (August 1, 1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 39) (noting as the basis of
authority for those standards the command in FLPMA that BLM manage the public lands so as
to prevent "unnecessary and undue degradation"); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1732(b) ("In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise,
take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.").
114 See National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L.No. 104-59, § 349(a), 109
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moratorium." 5 Prevented from promulgating an R.S. 2477 rule, Secretary
Babbitt, in 1997, issued a departmental policy statement that explicitly
revoked the 1988 Hodel policy." 6 It also noted that if the Department were
asked to make an R.S. 2477 determination during the moratorium, it would
apply state law in effect upon the passage of FLPMA "to the extent it is
consistent with Federal law," and it would rigorously examine whether
construction had occurred on the right-of-way prior to FLPMA-1 7 Secretary
Babbitt was not simply guessing that his Department might be asked to
make an R.S. 2477 determination: the opportunity was already on the
horizon.
On September 24, 1996, President Clinton used his authority under the
Antiquities Act'
to proclaim the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in southern Utah." 9 The reaction in Utah was mostly negative.
The congressional delegation, which had only learned of the President's
intentions in a Washington Post story some eleven days before the
proclamation, 20 criticized the President as a shameful and arrogant
opportunist and cried foul over the administration's failure to consult them
or to give any public notice of the proposal.' 2' In Kane and Garfield counties,
the southern Utah counties where the Monument is located, President
12
Clinton and Interior Secretary Babbitt were hung in effigy.
Stat. 568, 617-618 (1995) (sunset Sept. 30, 1996) (describing the moratorium).
115 See generallyOmnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996).
116 Memorandum from Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior to the Acting Assistant Secretaries
of Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Land and Minerals Mgmt., Indian Affairs, and Water and Science
regarding "Interim Departmental Policy on Revised Statute 2477 Grant of Right-of-Way for
Public Highways; Revocation of December 7, 1988 Policy" (Jan. 22, 1977) at 1, available at
http://www.highway-robbery.org/documents/1221997memofromBruceBabbittRS2477_
policy.pdf.
117 Id at 3.
118 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). Section 2 of the Act delegates broad authority to the President to

create national monuments:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects
of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by
the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a
part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.
119 For a review of President Clinton's designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, see James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Pight Path to Wilderness
Preservation 70 U. COLO. L.REV. 483 (1999).
120 See Tom Kenworthy, President Considers CarvingNationalMonument Out of Utah Land,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at A3 (reporting Clinton administration's plans to designate the
national monument).
121 See, e.g.,
Laurie Sullivan Maddox, Taking S vpes at Clinton, Utahns Vow to f Yght Back,
SALT LAKE ThiB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A5 (quoting Utah Senator Hatch that "[in all my years in the
U.S. Senate, I have never seen a clearer example of the arrogance of federal power ....Indeed,
this is the mother of all land grabs.").
122 See Paul Larmer, Beauty and the Beast- The President'sNew Monument ForcesSouthern
Utah to Faceits Tourism Future,HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 14, 1997, at 8 (quoting Kane County
Commissioner stating that "[i]t
was arrogant as hell for the president to use the law to his
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Soon after the Monument was declared, three southern Utah counties,
including Kane and Garfield, sent out road crews to blade (i.e., to use a road
grader to move earth with a snowplow-like blade) sixteen claimed R.S. 2477
rights-of-way within the Monument and elsewhere, including within
wilderness study areas and land proposed as wilderness in legislation
supported by the environmental community. Kane County Commissioner
Joe Judd described the decision this way:
What we said was, if they are having trouble judging if it's a road, we are going
to brighten those roads up," said Judd. "We went out and reestablished our
roads. We smoothed them out. Then they can't say it wasn't graded or it wasn't
maintained. It was to help them with their judgment. 123
In response to the counties' blading project, the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) sued BLM and the three Utah counties in
October 1996, arguing that the counties' road maintenance was illegal and
that BLM had failed to fulfill its obligations under FLPMA and the Antiquities
Act by not halting the counties' activities.1 24 Later that same month, the
United States filed cross-claim trespass actions against the counties.'2 5 The
case moved fitfully forward until February 1998, when BLM asked the court
to refer to the agency for initial determination whether the roads at issue
were valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 26 The Interior Department had the sort of
advantage as he did"); Laurie Sullivan Maddox, It's a MonumentalDayfor Utah,SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Sept. 18, 1996, at Al (describing "loss of rights" rally held in Kane County on the day of the
Monument's designation); Jim Woolf, A Pretty, Great Monument?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19,
1996, at A4 ("What I'd like to do is declare war on the White House... but my church and the
laws don't allow me to do that."); Kane County Holds a Bitter Wake After Monument Decision,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A7 (describing Kane County's reaction to the decision); David
Maraniss, Clinton Acts To Protect Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al (quoting
executive director of the Utah Association of Local Governments as saying, "this is the most
arrogant gesture I have seen in my lifetime.... The only comparable act I can think of is when a
country is ruled by a king and he sweeps his hand across a map and says, 'It will be thus!').
123 Tom Kenworthy, Blazing Utah Trails to Block a Washington Monument, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 1996, at Al. On September 26, 1996 San Juan County notified BLM of its intention to
maintain six of the roads and offered to allow BLM to assert a claim to those roads. See
Appellant's Reply Brief at 32, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No.
044071 (10th Cir. filed Sept. 16, 2004) (describing San Juan County's offer to the BLM).
124 See Brief of the Federal Appellee at 10, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of
Land Mgmt. (SUWA v.BM, No. 044071, (10th Cir., June 30, 2004).
125 See id.On appeal the counties have strenuously objected to the BLM, as a litigant in the
case, having the opportunity to make an initial determination of the validity of the R.S. 2477
claims to which the district court then gave some deference. San Juan County's brief illustrates
the frustration:
In this case the BLM served as policeman (see trespass citations); as plaintiff (see crossclaim); as legislator (see... determination which created new rules); as judge (see San
Juan's determination); and amicus for itself as judge (see BLM's extensive memorandum
requesting that the "court should affirm the determinations.") The sovereign's exercise of
so many roles hearkens to the days of King George I.
Brief of Appellants at 18, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 044071 (10th Cir. June 9, 2004).
126 Brief of the Federal Appellee at 3, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., Nos. 04-4071, 04-4073 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 2004). The motion was partly in reaction to the
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request for a determination that Secretary Babbitt had envisioned in his 1997
policy memorandum.127
Unsurprisingly, in investigating the road claims, BLM employed a
definition of "construction" that required some form of mechanical
construction and improvement. 2 ' Moreover, to be a "highway," BLM
concluded that the road must be freely open to the public.'29 Applying this
standard, along with the requirement that the area over which the alleged
right-of-way traverses not be otherwise reserved for a public use, 3 ° BLM
concluded that only one of the sixteen roads was a valid R.S. 2477 right-ofway.131 The district court gave BLM's statutory interpretation some
deference and affirmed the agency's determination of the status of the
sixteen roads. 132 The court reasoned that the BLM's interpretation was
consistent with current dictionary definitions of the word "construction.""
It also emphasized that a 1992 Interior Appropriations Act House
Conference Report had stated that the validity of an R.S. 2477 claim "should
be drawn from the intent of R.S. 2477 and FLPMA." 134 And because FLPMA's
purpose was that the public lands be retained in federal ownership,
the word
"construction" should be interpreted to help achieve that goal.135

district court's statement in responding to a summary judgment motion by Garfield County
seeking to quiet title to one particular road that "it appears to the court that when the validity of
an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, or the scope of the right-of-way, is challenged, it is for the BLM to
make a factual determination of the matter prior to the court's involvement." Id.at 12.
127 See Babbitt, supra notes 116-17, at 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing Secretary
Babbitt's 1997 policy memorandum).
128 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 147 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1137 (D. Utah 2001).
129 Id at 1143.
130 Id.at 1144. The BLM rejected some of the right-of-way claims on its finding that at the
time the counties made their R.S. 2477 claims, the land had been reserved for public use
pursuant to Coal Land Withdrawal No. 1, which was a 1910 reservation of public land in Utah
promulgated as part of the Pickett Act of 1910. SeeAct of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1; 36 Stat. 847
(giving the President authority to temporarily withdraw lands for various public purposes).
131SUWA, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
132 Id. at 1135. Because the BLM's statutory interpretation was based upon the Ferguson
letter, rather than formal rulemaking, the court stated that it was giving only limited deference
under the Supreme Court's decision holding that interpretations contained in informal formats
like the Ferguson letter are "entitled to respect" but only to the extent that those interpretations
have the "power to persuade." Id.(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
133 Id at 1139. The court also said that the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way was a
question of federal law and any suggestion to the contrary in Hodel was dicta. Id at 1143.
Although the district court decided that the standard for whether an R.S. 2477 right-of-way
exists is a question of federal law, other federal courts have suggested that the standard is a
matter of state law. See Wilkenson v. Dept. of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986); Barker
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D. Colo. 1999); United States v. Jenks,
804 F. Supp. 232, 235 (D.N.M. 1992) rev'd in part on othergrounds, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.
1994); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594, 604 (D. Colo. 1987).
134See SUWA, 147 F. Supp. 2d. at 1139 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-5503 (1992) (Conf. Rep.));
138 CONG. REC. H9306-01, H9325 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992).
135 SUWA, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-40. Using the goals of FLPMA, enacted in 1976, to interpret
the meaning of R.S. 2477, enacted in 1866, seems plainly incorrect. See United States v. SCS
Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Post-enactment legislative
history-perhaps better referred to as 'legislative future'-becomes of absolutely no
significance when the subsequent Congress... takes on the role of a court and in its reports
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The district court's decision, which is currently on appeal to the Tenth
Circuit, 36 also found persuasive BLM's argument that an actual construction
standard was required by the Supreme Court's decision in BearLake & River
37
Waterworks & Irrigation Co. v. Garland(Bear Lake rmgaton),1
which
3
considered § 9 of the 1866 Mining Act." Similar to R.S. 2477, which appears
in § 8 of the Act, § 9 provided that "the right-of-way for construction of
ditches and canals for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and
confirmed... .139 The Supreme Court stated that
JuInder this statute no right or title to the land, or to a right of way over or
through it, or to the use of water from a well thereafter to be dug, vests, as
against the government, in the party entering upon possession from the mere
fact of such possession unaccompanied by the performance of any labor
thereon .... It is the doing of the work, the completion of the well, or the
digging of the ditch, within a reasonable time from the taking of possession,
that gives the right to use the water in the well or
the right of way for the
140
ditches of the canal upon or through the public land.
The district court agreed with the BLM that the same word "construction"
that appeared in both § 8 and § 9 should be given the same interpretationactual labor directed at construction was necessary for title to vest.'
Although it is not entirely clear in Bear Lake Irigationwhether the Court
applied a federal or state law definition of construction, 142 the case again
illustrates the typical nineteenth century congressional view that the "mere
fact" of possession-capture alone-was not sufficient to give good title.
In the months prior to the designation of the Grand Staircase, yet
another Utah case had arisen that both illustrated the bitter nature of R.S.
2477 disputes and provided insight into a point that is often frustrating to
rural counties: Even where a county has an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the rightof-way can still be subject to federal regulation." The case, fittingly enough,
arose again along the Burr Trail. In February 1996, without seeking a permit

asserts the meaning of a prior statute.").
136 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA II), 425 F.3d 735
(10th Cir. 2005). See also Heidi McIntosh, New i'ghways Underan Old La w? R.S. 24 77and Its
Implicationsfor the Futureof Utah "sFederalPublicLands UTAH BAR JOURNAL, May 12, 2005, at
16 (citing a February 11, 2005 oral argument date), also available at http://www.utahbar.
org/barjournal/archives/000270.html.
137 164 U.S. 1 (1896).
138 Mining Act of 1866 § 9, 14 Stat. 251.
139 Id.
140 BearLake Irrigation,164 U.S. at 18-19.
141 SUWA, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. See also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 58 (1995) (noting that

it is a "basic canon of statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same
meaning").
142 BearLake Irrigation,164 U.S. at 18. The Court emphasized that the right-of-way would be
acknowledged and confirmed "when rights have become vested and accrued, which are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and decisions of courts .... " Id. The
Court also noted that the labor requirement was consonant with prior Utah case law. Id. at 19.
143 United States v. Garfield County, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1223 (D.Utah 2000) (Garfield
County).
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from the National Park Service as required by Park Service regulations, 1"
Garfield County road crews performed what they described as routine road
improvement along the Burr Trail at the entrance to Capitol Reef National
Park. The county crews bulldozed a portion of a hillside to improve sight
lines for travelers. As the county viewed it, as long as it stayed within the
scope of its R.S. 2477 right-of-way the federal government had no business
interfering.1 45 The United States sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as trespass damages. Although the United States exaggerated
its factual allegation that the county had "completely transformed the
gateway to the National Park" by "removing half of the hillside that framed
its entrance," 46 its legal argument was sound. As the district court
concluded, under both the Property Clause 147 and the Commerce Clause, 1"
the federal government plainly had authority to regulate a right-of-way
across federal land.149 The court also decided that in this case the county had
actually exceeded the scope of its right-of-way and trespassed on federal
lands. 150
Although it is well-established under the Property Clause that federal
regulatory authority can extend beyond the public lands to adjacent private
property, 151 this precedent has never been embraced by many sagebrush
rebels in the rural West. Indeed, in their view, continued federal ownership

144 The relevant regulation provided that "constructing or attempting to construct a... road,
trail, path, or other way.., upon, across, over, through or under any park areas, except in
accordance with the provisions of a valid permit, contract, or other written agreement with the
United States, is prohibited." 36 C.F.R. § 5.7 (2005).
145 Garfield County, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1223. As Garfield County saw it, "the assertion of
federal regulatory authority over its right-of-way" was the equivalent of federal "reacquisition of
the interests it received under the R.S. § 2477 grant-a retrocession of ownership or jurisdiction
to which it has not consented." Id.
146 Consider the before and after pictures of Garfield County's road work at the entrance to
Capitol Reef, and ask whether the United States is taking just as aggressive a view as the
counties in arguing about what does and does not constitute part of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.
Official R.S. 2477 Website, Which Photo Is Before and Which Photo Is After, at
http://www.rs2477roads.com/2boral.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
147 See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (assigning to Congress the "power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States").
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
149 GarfieldCounty, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-41. As the court noted, the United States wore
two hats: "one as the proprietor of an estate in land servient to Garfield County's right-of-way,
the other as a governmental instrumentality invested with the power to make rules and
regulations concerning that same property." Id In the end, its regulatory authority could not be
trumped by its servient ownership status. The only limit on its regulatory authority was that it
had to be reasonable. Id. at 1241. "At the same time, however, the Park Service may not
preclude or unreasonably interfere with the reasonable exercise of the rights of those who hold
valid rights-of-way within the boundaries of the Park." Id.
150 The court awarded the United States $6,840.00 in damages. Id at 1265.
151 See, e.g., Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-44 (1976) (holding that the property
clause gives Congress authority to regulate activities on state or private land that will affect
public land); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523-29 (1897) (stating that Congress can
regulate fences that enclose public land even though they are erected outside the federal land).
Federal authority over private land could also be asserted under the Commerce Clause or other
constitutionally enumerated powers.
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of the public lands is itself unconstitutional. 52 It is, nevertheless, a critical
fact to remember in considering R.S. 2477. For these counties, a "win" on
R.S. 2477 does not mean that they will have the unfettered ability to control
what happens within their right-of-way. As often as not, any extensive work
on an existing right-of-way will trigger NEPA analysis and ultimately be
limited by federal efforts to protect adjacent resources. In the end, county
authority over an R.S. 2477 right-of-way may not look all that different than
county authority with respect to a right-of-way obtained by permission
under Subchapter V of FLPMA-l' That is not to say that there is no
difference between an R.S. 2477 right-of-way and one granted by permit."M
152 See generally RASBAND ET AL.,

supra note 22, at 146-57 (discussing arguments of

Sagebrush rebels).
153 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-65 (2000). Under FLPMA, a
person seeking a right-of-way across federal lands must apply to the Secretary of the Interior or
the Secretary of the Agriculture for a permit. The Secretaries are authorized, in their discretion,
to issue permits for roads, canals, ditches, pipelines, utility corridors, and the like, but each
right-of-way must contain:
such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned deems necessary to (i) protect
Federal property and economic interests; (ii) manage efficiently the lands which are
subject to the right-of-way or adjacent thereto and protect the other lawful users of the
lands adjacent to or traversed by such right-of-way; (iii) protect lives and property; (iv)
protect the interests of individuals living in the general area traversed by the right-of-way
who rely on the fish, wildlife, and other biotic resources of the area for subsistence
purposes; (v) require location of the right-of-way along a route that will cause least
damage to the environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant
factors; and (vi) otherwise protect the public interest in the lands traversed by the rightof-way or adjacent thereto.
Id.§ 1765(b).
154 R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are not the only property rights that allow access across federal
lands. There is, for example, an implied property right to access inheld school trust lands,
inheld private parcels, and unpatented mining claims. Where the access seeker has an implied
property right to access, a variety of statutory and regulatory provisions can apply depending on
the designation of the federal lands within which access is sought and on the type of activity for
which the access is desired. With respect to the national forests, for example, Congress has
provided that
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms and conditions as
the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary shall provide such access to
nonfederally owned land within the boundaries of the National Forest System as the
Secretary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment
thereof: Provided, That such owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to
ingress and egress to or from the National Forest System.
National Wilderness Preservation System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a). Oddly enough, this particular
provision giving direction for all national forests is contained within the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). The Wilderness Act in section 1134(a) similarly
provides for access to state or privately owned land surrounded by wilderness.
In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely surrounded by
national forest lands within areas designated by this chapter as wilderness, such State or
private owner shall be given such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate access
to such State-owned or privately owned land by such State or private owner and their
successors in interest, or the State-owned land or privately owned land shall be
exchanged for federally owned land in the same State of approximately equal value
under authorities available to the Secretary of Agriculture ....
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Although the terms and conditions imposed as part of an agency's regulatory
authority on an R.S. 2477 right-of-way can closely resemble the terms and
conditions imposed on a discretionary right-of-way permit under Subchapter
V of FLPMA, the relevant agency may be free to deny, or impose arduous
conditions on a FLPMA permit where the access seeker has no claim of right
and therefore cannot make a takings claim.
Utah, whose public lands have been at the center of the national
wilderness debate in the last decade and thus the focal point of R.S. 2477
litigation, started yet another chapter of R.S. 2477 litigation before the end of
the Clinton administration. Rather than allowing R.S. 2477 policy to be
created by ad hoc litigation resulting from the individual federal-county
disputes described above, the State of Utah decided on a different and more
comprehensive approach.155 In June 2000, pursuant to the Quiet Title Act,
which waives sovereign immunity for disputes over "title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest,"'56 Utah sent the Department of
Interior a notice of intent to sue to establish its rights to approximately 1000
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 15 7 By the time the notice period had run, George W.
Bush of Texas had been elected President. Unsurprisingly, Utah changed its
strategy, realizing that a new approach-or, perhaps more accurately, an old
approach-to R.S. 2477 might be in the offing.

16 U.S.C.

§ 1134(a).

Subsection (b) provides similar access to mining claims in wilderness:

In any case where valid mining claims or other valid occupancies are wholly within a
designated national forest wilderness area, the Secretary of Agriculture shall by
reasonable regulations consistent with the preservation of the area as wilderness, permit
ingress and egress to such surrounded areas by means which have been or are being
customarily enjoyed with respect to other such areas similarly situated.
16 U.S.C. § 1134(b). For an overview of access issues, see Daniel A. Jensen, How Do I Get
There?Access to andAcross Minlng Claims andMineral Leases, 45 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 201 (1999).
155 Utah had also found itself stymied in Congress. Prior to the congressional moratorium,
Utah Representative Hansen had introduced a bill that proposed to allow R.S. 2477 claimants to
file a claim within ten years of the statute's enactment. See Revised Statutes 2477 Rights-of-Way
Settlement Act, H.R. 2081, 104th Cong. (1995) (accompanied in the Senate by S. 1425, 104th
Cong. (1995)). Under the bill, the United States had two years to accept or reject the claim. If it
rejected the claim, it had to file a lawsuit in which it would bear the burden of proof, and the
existence of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way would be determined by state law. Id. §§ 3(b), 5(c). The
bill never made it beyond the House Resources Committee. See Kevin Hayes, History and
Future of the Conflict over Wilderness Designations of BLM Land in Utah, 16 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 203, 232 (2001) (discussing the proposed legislation).
156 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). Under the Quiet Title Act, actions must be commenced within
twelve years of the date on which the action accrues, unless the action is filed by a state. Id §
2409a(g).
157 Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 20, at 495-96. Subsection (in) of the Quiet Title Act
requires that a State give the federal government 180 days notice before bringing a quiet title
action. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(m). A copy of the notice of intent to sue is available at: Letter to Bruce
Babbitt from the State of Utah, http://www.rs2477.com/documents6-14-2000 ltrtoBruce_
Babbitfrom_State-of Utah.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). For maps depicting the claims, see
Highway Robbery: Utah's Lands at Risk http://www.highway-robbery.org/lands/utah.htmn (last
visited Nov. 19, 2005).
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5. The Bush Years
By now the turn of events should be familiar-with a new
administration came a new approach to R.S. 2477.15 Soon after President
Bush took office in 2001, the Department of the Interior began negotiating
with Utah regarding Utah's notice of intent to sue. The product of that
negotiation was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in April
2003.159 The MOU provided that Utah and its counties could seek from the
Department of the Interior a recordable disclaimer of interest (essentially a
federal quit-claim deed) for claimed R.S. 2477 roads. According to the MOU,
an R.S. 2477 right-of-way exists if:
a. the road existed prior to the enactment of FLPMA in 1976 and is in use at the
present time;
b. the road can be identified by centerline description or other appropriate legal
description;
c. the existence of the road prior to the enactment of FLPMA is documented by
information sufficient to support a conclusion that the road meets the legal
requirements of a right-of-way granted under R.S. 2477; this information may
include, but is not limited to, photographs, affidavits, surveys, government
records concerning the road, information concerning or information reasonably
inferred from the road's current conditions; and
d. the road was and continues to be public and capable of accommodating
automobiles or trucks with
four wheels and has been the subject of some type
160
of periodic maintenance.
While not very specific-presumably to avoid running afoul of the 1996
congressional moratorium on R.S. 2477 rulemaking-the MOU language
hints at a more generous definition of construction than the one employed
by the Clinton administration. Nevertheless, the basic operating principle of
the MOU was that many asserted R.S. 2477 rights-of-way will satisfy the
"construction" standard under any definition of that term,'61 and that both

158 Further mirroring the prior course of R.S. 2477, with a change in the executive branch has
come a corresponding effort from the congressional minority to push more restrictive R.S. 2477
legislation. Just like Utah Republican Representative Hansen proposed a county-friendly R.S.
2477 during the Clinton administration, see supra note 155 (discussing the bill), Colorado
Democrat Representative Mark Udall introduced a bill on April 3, 2003 that would have adopted
an administrative process for resolving R.S. 2477 road claims similar to that proposed by
Secretary Babbitt in 1994. See H.R. 1639, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (text of bill introduced by
Udall). Similar to Babbitt's proposed rule, Udall's bill defined "construction" as "an intentional
physical act or series of intentional physical acts that were intended to prepare, and that
accomplished preparation of, a highway by a durable, observable, physical modification of the
land along the entire claimed route...." Id. at § 2(7).
159 Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Department of
Interior on State and County Road Acknowledgement (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.rs2477.com/documents/MOUUtahDOI.pdf.
160 Id. at 3.
161 See id at 1 (stating: "Most of the asserted R.S. 2477 rights-of-way that actually have been
part of western states' inventoried and maintained transportation infrastructure since before
the enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976 satisfy the
statutory requirements of 'construction' and 'highway' under almost any interpretation of those

1040

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 35:1005

parties would benefit by resolving such claims without litigation. In an effort
to avoid the most controversial R.S. 2477 claims, Utah also agreed that it
would not use the MOU process to assert a right-of-way for roads within
wilderness areas, wilderness study areas, or any unit of the National Park or
also been
National Wildlife Refuge Systems. 62 Colorado and Alaska have
163
Interior.
the
of
Department
the
with
MOUs
own
their
pursuing
The recordable disclaimer of interest process that the MOU proposed to
use is a reference to amended disclaimer regulations promulgated by the
Interior Department two months before the signing of the MOU. 16 The
disclaimer regulations, which implement FLPMA's Recordable Disclaimer of
Interest provision,'6 5 provide for Department of the Interior disclaimers of
federal ownership interests. The amended regulations make it easier to
obtain federal recognition of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in two senses. First, the
regulations eliminate the previous requirement that a claimant be the
current "owner of record" and thereby allow states and counties to obtain
disclaimers despite the fact that they are not record owners. 66 Second,the
amendments interpret the word "State" in the Quiet Title Act's exemption

statutory terms.").
162 Id. at 2. Utah has made several road claims under the MOU and has listed a total of
twenty for which it intends to file claims under the MOU. See State of Utah, State Records
Committee Appeal 04-04, http://archives.utah.gov/appeals/04-04.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005)
(granting in part and denying in part an appeal of a discovery request of R.S. 2477 documents).
The process, however, has proved slower than Utah hoped. Not only has the BLM been slow to
process the MOU claims, but any claim BLM approves is likely to be challenged both on the
ground that the MOU violates the congressional moratorium, see infra text accompanying note
169, and on the R.S. 2477 standard employed to resolve the claim. Although the environmental
community would likely not agree, the Bush administration has not been particularly
accommodating to Utah on R.S. 2477. Not only has it been slow to respond to MOU claims, but
it has also maintained on appeal to the Tenth Circuit its position that mechanical construction
of a public highway is a necessary prerequisite to establishing an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. SUWA
v. BLM, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (D. Utah 2001). Although the Secretary's brief asserts that
the Department "retains discretion to reconsider its interpretation of R.S. 2477 in the context of
future administrative policymaldng," the brief also argues that "'construction' requires 'actual
construction' insofar that '[slome form of mechanical construction must have occurred to
construct or improve the highway.'" Brief of the Federal Appellee at 44 n. 13, 49, SUWA v. BLM,
No. 04-4071 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 2004). In light of the uncertainties with the MOU process, Utah
has begun to return its attention to the Quiet Title Act process it began in 2000. It has given the
Department of the Interior notice of Utah's intent to sue on a number of claims, including
claims for roads in Canyonlands National Park and adjacent to wilderness study areas.
McIntosh, supranote 136, at 19.
163 Birdsong, supranote 48, at 537.
164 See Final Rule on Conveyances, Disclaimers, and Correction Documents ("Amended
Disclaimer Regulations"), 68 Fed. Reg. 494 (Jan. 6, 2003) (summarizing amendments to
regulations); 43 C.F.R. § 1864.0-5 (2005) (containing definitions relating to recordable
disclaimers of interest in land).
165 43 U.S.C. § 1745(a) (2000) ("After consulting with any affected Federal agency, the
Secretary is authorized to issue a document of disclaimer of interest or interests in any lands in
any form suitable for recordation, where the disclaimer will help remove a cloud on the title of
such lands and where he determines (1) a record interest of the United States in lands has
terminated by operation of law or is otherwise invalid....").
166 See Final Rule on Conveyances, Disclaimers, and Correction Documents ("Amended
Disclaimer Regulations"), 68 Fed. Reg. 494 (Jan. 6, 2003).
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167
from the twelve year statute of limitations to include the various political
subdivisions of a state.168
The MOU and the amended disclaimer regulations have drawn fire from
the environmental community. At one level the criticism simply tracks the
same debate that has been raging since FLPMA repealed R.S. 2477. There is
concern that the Department of the Interior will rely on the MOU to disclaim
rights-of-way without insisting on mechanical construction of a public
highway. A second criticism is a bit less familiar. Finding itself on the other
side of the regulatory fence, the environmental community has taken up the
same shield that was once used against it to defeat Secretary Babbitt's R.S.
2477 regulatory efforts. It has alleged that the MOU and the amended
disclaimer regulations violate Congress' 1996 moratorium on new R.S. 2477
regulations. 61 9

B. R.S. 2477'A Rule of Capture?
R.S. 2477 sits on the cusp of several important developments. The Tenth
pending decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) v.
Circuit's
BLM 70 may prove to be the most important decision on the meaning of R.S.
2477 in the long history of the statute. At the same time, after years of study
and preparation, Utah is moving forward on a variety of R.S. 2477 claims,
under the MOU and the Quiet Title Act. 171 What happens in the Tenth Circuit
and the other claims percolating in Utah, and in the other states, will depend
significantly upon whether the courts view nineteenth century public land
law through the lens of capturer or improver.
How is R.S. 2477 to be interpreted almost 140 years after passage of the
statute and just under thirty years after FLPMA's repeal? As an initial matter,
the courts will need to decide which administrative interpretations of R.S.
2477 are entitled to deference. Here, the argument of the states and counties
is stronger than that of the environmental community. As a general matter,
167 See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (2000) (stating "any civil action under this section, except for an

action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the
date upon which it accrued.").
168 See 43 C.F.R. § 1864.0-5(h) ("State means 'the state and any of its creations including any
governmental instrumentality within a state, including cities, counties, or other official local
governmental entities.'").
169 See National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 349(a), 109
Stat. 568, 617-18 (1995) (sunset Sept. 30, 1996) (declaring that no federal agency may create any
rule addressing rights-of-way authorized under R.S. 2477); Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (appropriating funds to
federal agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997). For an argument that the
combination of the MOU and the amended disclaimer regulations violate the congressional
moratorium, see Sarah Krakoff, Settling the Wildemess, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1159, 1181-85
(2004). In 2004, the Government Accounting Office issued a report concluding that the
disclaimer regulations did not violate the moratorium but that the MOU did. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECOGNITION OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR'S FLPMA DISCLAIMER RULES AND ITS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE STATE
OF UTAH, (Feb. 6, 2004), availableathttp://www.suwaorg/ibrary/R.S.2477.GAO.Opinion.2.6.04.

pdf.
170 147 F.Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Utah 2001).

171 See supranote 162 (describing Utah's notices of intent to sue under the Quiet Title Act).
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where the agency entrusted with implementing a particular law adopts a
contemporaneous and reasonable interpretation of a statute through formal
rulemaking or adjudication, its interpretation is entitled to deference.' 72
Moreover, agency interpretations, such as the Ferguson letter, that are
adopted long after the passage of an act and that are not contained in
rulemaking are not entitled to the same deference as a contemporaneous
rulemaking. 173 In the case of R.S. 2477, there was no contemporaneous
agency interpretation of the statute. The first Interior decision came in 1898
and the first regulatory guidance in 1938.174 Nevertheless, logic suggests that
the pre-FLPMA interpretation of R.S. 2477 is more likely to accurately
identify congressional intent than is a post-FLPMA interpretation where the
government's purposes and interests had plainly changed.
Also helpful to the states and counties' position is the significant
number of state and lower federal court decisions suggesting that the
75
existence and scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way is a matter for state law.
Although the federal government's interest in the public lands cannot be
defeated by congressional acquiescence in these decisions, 76 it is also true
that long congressional acquiescence in a particular interpretation
of a
77
interpretation.
that
of
ratification
indicate
can
statute
federal
The pre-FLPMA administrative and state interpretations of R.S. 2477
point in the direction of a rather generous definition of "construction" and
coincide with the general perception of the nineteenth century as the
century of capture. On the other hand, the historical aspiration of Congress,
which was enshrined in statute after statute although not always fulfilled in
practice, was that obtaining title to the public lands depended upon more
than capture and required some sort of effort at improvement. Thus, to the
extent that state law purports to allow rights-of-way to be claimed in the
absence of labor and effort, it is hard to square with congressional intent.
Here, the environmental community seems to have the better of the
argument. Surely, there is some limit on how far states can go in defining the
existence and scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. That limit can be described
in terms of reasonableness, 78 or it can be described as requiring some
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984).
173 Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 320 n.6 (1984); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
174 See supraPart V.A. 1 (discussing the pre-FLPMA development of the law on R.S. 2477).
175 See supra notes 89-91 & 106 and accompanying text (discussing this case law). Although
state court interpretation of R.S. 2477 prior to FLPMA was quite consistent, the acquiescence
story is murkier after FLPMA's passage. Given that both the Carter and Clinton Administrations
decided that the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way was a question of federal law, it is hard
to identify the interpretation of R.S. 2477 to which recent congresses have been deferring.
176 See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955) (holding that the longheld state understanding that the Desert Land Act worked a severance of waters from the public
domain and gave states the authority to govern water rights did not apply to federal
reservations).
177 See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915) (observing that
"government is a practical affair intended for practical men" and that "in determining the
meaning of a statute. . . ,weight shall be given to the usage itself-even when the validity of the
practice is the subject of investigation").
178 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing this implicit limit on all state
172 Chevron
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minimal improvement content to R.S. 2477. In other words, even if state law
controls the existence and scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, state law must
conform to a reasonable definition of the word "construction." Perhaps that
does not mean mechanical construction such as grading, paving, or placing
culverts, but unless R.S. 2477 is simply a rule of capture-which seems
unlikely given the repeated emphasis on improvement in nineteenth century
public land law-a claimant ought to be required to point to a reasonable
amount of labor directed at making the road passable to vehicle traffic."
V. CONCLUSION

In the case of many public land statutes, the loose interpretation and
application of statutory improvement requirements has already occurred
and title has vested. The conundrum with R.S. 2477 is that the balancing of
congressional aspiration versus on-the-ground practice is being done in the
early twenty-first century rather than in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Imagine, for example, what it would be like if all
homestead and preemption claims had been self-executing grants, as was
the case with R.S. 2477, and courts were now faced with the question
whether the occupant had accomplished sufficient improvement or
cultivation on his 160 or 320 acre claim prior to 1976. Would statutory
requirements like "cultivation" and "improvement" be interpreted with more
rigor today than they would have been in 1880? And, if so, would that be an
appropriate statutory interpretation? How much weight would be assigned
to the congressional aspiration of supporting improvement of individual
parcels, and how much to the subsequent practice of capture-like
homesteading and the broader congressional objective of settling the
West? i"' These are the sorts of questions presented by R.S. 2477, and the
law definitions of federal statutes).
179 Understanding R.S. 2477 as containing an improvement requirement would not
necessarily require improvement efforts along an entire right-of-way. Particularly in the arid
Southwest where there can be areas with little vegetation, flat topography, or slickrock, it may
be the case that a road would not require improvement efforts within certain sections. This
understanding of an improvement requirement would be little different than in the Homestead
Act or other land grant statutes where some portion of the acreage, rather than all of the
acreage, had to be improved to merit title.
180 As another analogy, consider the water law doctrine of beneficial use. In recent decades,
there has been an effort to invest the beneficial use and waste doctrines with real teeth-to
remind courts that water law is not a pure rule of capture. This effort has borne some fruit. See
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 (1990)
(finding waste in the Imperial Irrigation District's use of water and noting that "[a]U things must
end, even in the field of water law. Itis time to recognize that this law is in flux and that its
evolution has passed beyond traditional concepts of vested and immutable rights"). However, it
has not been broadly successful because the idea that paper water rights are permanently
vested is so firmly embedded in western water law. An interesting question is why the vested
rights idea is so firmly entrenched. Is it because beneficial use was always a meaningless
adornment on a rule of capture? Is it because there has been a departure from the original
understanding of the beneficial use doctrine as a matter of administrative convenience or
government acquiescence? Or is it simply that the original understanding of the beneficial use
doctrine has lain dormant because the resource pressure has not been sufficient to require
careful consideration of the doctrine's meaning?
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answers are not obvious. Any interpretation of R.S. 2477 ought, however, to
recognize not only that Congress was eager to grant resources and rights-ofway in order to develop the West but also that Congress did not generally
regard a pure rule of capture as the way to accomplish that objective.
Understanding that the nineteenth century was not simply the century
of capture also has implications beyond R.S. 2477. With the accelerating
public preference for preservation and recreational opportunities, natural
resources law and policy has in recent years increasingly focused on the
question of what can be done to reacquire or reallocate natural resources
that many perceive to have been unwisely disposed of during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. This reacquisition and reallocation has taken a
number of forms. In some cases, it has involved purchase such as in the case
of grazing buyouts, the purchase of important habitat and watersheds using
the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and the purchase of water rights for
instream flow purposes. Other times, reacquisition has come in the form of
more aggressive regulation of natural resource use. Another method,
although little used, has been the assertion of long dormant public trust
interests in previously allocated resources.18 ' Our choice of which route to
use to remedy prior resource allocations in response to changing public
preference will depend in part on our perception of the nature of the existing
resource user's ownership interest. Labeling nineteenth century natural
resource law as a product of the rule of capture has the potential to
misdirect our reallocation efforts. It risks forgetting that in some cases
improvement was required but not accomplished and that in many other
cases labor and improvement, rather than mere capture, is the foundation of
the resource owner's reliance interest.
VI. EPILOGUE
Four months after the conclusion of the Rule of Capture conference, on
September 8, 2005, the Tenth Circuit issued its decision in Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Managemen 182 Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Michael McConnell rejected the BLM's argument
that mechanical construction was necessary to establish an R.S. 2477 rightof-way and held instead that a valid right-of-way could be created by use
alone.
Before addressing the meaning of R.S. 2477, the Tenth Circuit decided
that the Secretary of the Interior and BLM did not have primary jurisdiction
over R.S. 2477 disputes. According to the court, because R.S. 2477 was a selfexecuting grant, deciding on the passage of title was a judicial rather than
executive function. As the court put it:
It is one thing for an agency to make determinations regarding conditions
precedent to the passage of title, and quite another for the agency to assert a
181 For a discussion of this move toward reacquisition, see James R. Rasband, Buying Back
the Wes4 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 179 (2004).
182 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management (SUWA f), 425 F.3d
735 (10th Cir. 2005).
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continuing authority to resolve by informal adjudication disputes between itself
and private parties who claim that they acquired legal title to real property
interests at some point in the past.183
The court concluded that BLM has authority to make nonbinding,
administrative determinations as to the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-ofway and to introduce and use its findings as evidence in litigation, but that
"nothing in the terms of R.S 2477 gives the BLM authority to make binding
8 4
determinations on the validity of the rights-of-way granted thereunder."
This conclusion, said the court, was "reinforced by the long history of
practice under the statute, during which the BLM has consistently
disclaimed authority to make binding decisions on R.S. 2477 rights-of18 5
way."
On the statutory interpretation question that is the focus of this article,
the court first held that although the meaning of R.S. 2477 was necessarily a
question of federal law, in determining what actions were required for
acceptance of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, federal law "borrows" from longestablished principles of state and common law. Citing as an example the
Douglas County8 6 decision discussed above, 87 the court emphasized that
state law could not override federal law or undermine federal land policy,
but that courts should use state law "to the extent [it] provides convenient
8
and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent.""
Then, applying state and common law to the interpretation of the word
"construction," the court held that acceptance of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way
could be manifested by continuous public use over a sufficient period of
time (in Utah, noted the court, the necessary period has been ten years). The
court concluded that mechanical construction of the right-of-way was not
necessary to manifest acceptance. Evidence of construction may be
relevant, but it was not a required element to establish a valid right-of-way:
"The necessary extent of 'construction' would be the construction necessary
i8 9
to enable the general public to use the route for its intended purposes."
The court further concluded that a standard of continuous use instead
of mechanical construction would not necessarily lead to an abundance of
R.S. 2477 claims because:
it is quite possible for R.S. 2477 claims to pass the BLM's 'mechanical
construction' standard but to fail the common law test of continuous public
use. See Town of Rolling v. Emrich, 99 N.W. 464, 464 (Wis.1904) (rejecting R.S.
2477 claim despite evidence that two men "cut out a road... through the 80
acres in question to haul logs upon"). For example, according to the BLM

183 Id.at 752.
184 Id at 757.
185 Id
186 Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 446 (1898).
187 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary of the Interior's
rejection of the county's attempt to accept R.S. 2477 grants to the extent of 30 feet alongside all
section lines in the county).
188 SUW4 , 425 F.3d at 766.
189 Id at 768.
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administrative decision, San Juan County route 507, in the Hart's Point area,
shows signs of mechanical construction: bulldozer grouser marks, berms,
pushed trees and debris, and cut banks, and a witness testified that the road
was constructed by mining companies in the 1950s, using bulldozers, for the
purpose of accessing seismic lines. Yet the BLM found that "the use of this
route by the public has been at most sporadic and infrequent." The record
indicates that the same may be true of others of the contested routes. Large
parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads
constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but
not by the general public.... The common law standard of user, which takes
evidence of construction into consideration along with other evidence of use by
the general public, seems better calculated to distinguish between rights of way
genuinely accepted through continual public use over a lengthy period of time,
and routes which, though mechanically constructed (at least in part), served
of time, and never formed part of the
limited purposes for limited 19periods
0
public transportation system.
Whether the Tenth Circuit is correct about a continuous use standard
not leading to an explosion of R.S. 2477 claims will play out over time as will
other implications of the decision. For example, given the court's denial of
BLM's authority to adjudicate R.S. 2477 claims, there are questions about the
validity of BLM's Memorandum of Understanding with Utah. To the extent
that the MOU is understood as a method of informally adjudicating R.S. 2477
claims, it may not survive. On the other hand, if the MOU is viewed as
merely recognizing BLM's ability to issue recordable disclaimers, it may
survive, but only because it needlessly restates a proposition that is
otherwise true-that the BLM has authority to disclaim federal ownership
interests that might otherwise be contested via quiet title action in federal
court.
And, finally, what of the implications of the Tenth Circuit's decision for
the thesis of this article-that, given the improvement rationale which
animated so many public lands statutes, it is unlikely Congress intended R.S.
2477 as a pure capture rule? On that score, the opinion must be read as
rejecting an improver rationale. Indeed, the court rejected the argument that
R.S. 2477 should be interpreted in line with the incentive and reward
structure present in other land-grant statutes:
The trouble with this theory is that those who made the investment in the road
did not receive any rights to it; R.S. 2477 rights of way are owned by the public
and not by the individuals who "constructed" the highways. A more probable

190 Id. at 781-82 (citations omitted). The court reached a few additional issues not directly
implicated in this article. It also held 1) that R.S. 2477 claimants bear the burden of proof; 2)
that coal withdrawals under the Coal Lands Act of 1910, 30 U.S.C. § 83 (2000) did not constitute
a reservation for public use as contemplated by R.S. 2477 because withdrawals merely make
public land unavailable for certain kinds of private appropriation under the public land laws,
whereas a reservation not only withdraws land "from the operation of the public land laws, but
also dedicates the land to a particular public use,"; and 3) that the holder of an R.S. 2477 rightof-way across federal land must consult with the appropriate federal land management agency
before it undertakes any improvements to the right-of-way beyond routine maintenance. Id at
748.
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intention of Congress was to ensure that widely used routes would remain open
to the public even after homesteaders or other land claimants obtained title to
the land over which the public traveled. That explanation of congressional
intent is more consistent with the common law interpretation than with the
Appellees' proposed substitute. 191
The court's suggestion that the federal government would have been less
concerned about improvement where the captured benefit was public
instead of private is not without merit. Indeed, contrary to this article's
thesis, one could assert that because the public may continue to use the
right-of-way, characterizing any interpretation of R.S. 2477 as a capture rule
may be mistaken given that, traditionally, capture rules have resulted in
private and exclusive ownership of a resource.
From the perspective of the federal government and the national public,
however, the right-of-way is still captured in the sense that the future
disposition of the resource is determined by a state or county rather than by
Congress or a federal land manager. One could argue that states and
counties may only use the right-of-way if they are fulfilling the federal
purpose of providing a public highway. Nevertheless, the promise of shared
access to a right-of-way controlled by a state or county is not the same as
exclusive federal ownership and control. Before Congress would have
agreed to give up ownership in favor of shared access, it would have wanted
at least to ensure that the road it would share would be one that had been
improved. Presumably, this was Congress's thinking in the variety of other
statutes discussed in the article where Congress conditioned road grants on
states actually expending labor to construct a road.'9 2 It is unclear why
Congress would take a different approach in R.S. 2477 or why Congress
would have perceived the need to give away ownership in return for a
shared right-of-way that was already usable without effort. It seems more
likely that the trade-off for ceding federal control was the fact that a state,
county, or private party would perform at least some work to make and
maintain a passable public right-of-way. Finally, even setting aside this tradeoff rationale, it is important to recall that the improvement requirements in
nineteenth century public land law were not simply incentive and reward
structures but reflected a more basic ethos that property rights that flowed
from labor and improvement were superior to rights derived from capture
and use.

191 Id. at 780.
192 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (describing federal statutes conditioning
grants on specific road improvements).

